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Chapter 1
Introduction
China’s phenomenal economic rise is a key point of the world economy in recent three
decades. China’s GDP increases by 9.68% averagely from 1978 to 2006 (Data source:
National Bureau of Statistics of China). Although most of the developed countries
experienced rapid economic growth in the early 1900s, or after the Second World War,
no other countries continued such a high GDP growth in so long a period. By the rapid
economic growth, accompanied by industrialization and urbanization, China’s social
and economic structure changes greatly. Strong economic growth gives strong demands
in both production and consumption sides. As a result, resource shortages on social
infrastructure and natural resource, defects in institution on the rise of market economic
system and the decline of planned economic system, urban-rural and coastal-inland
conflicts become the topical issues to be solved to support China’s lasting development.
Under this background, a number of development policies are proposed.
National development policies are targeted to create comprehensive welfare gains in
the country. Inevitably, they might induce differential outcomes across regions and
people. Identifying the precise effects of a policy is a complex and challenging task, but
it is important to give reference to policy-makers so as to improve the targeting and
efficacy of policies. Now, comparing policy effects across different regions and countries
is receiving greater attention, as projects target larger populations and become more
ambitious in scope, and researchers acquire enough data to be able to test specific policy
questions across localities (Khandker et al., 2010). Moreover, to evaluate the impact to
development policies, we need take consideration of both their overall outcomes and their
side (unintended) effects to specific regions/sectors/people. That is, given the target of
relevant policies, the policy impacts to non-targeted regions/sectors/people should also
be taken consideration. However, it is always been neglected in policy impact evaluation,
due to data availability and difficulties on measurement.
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Giving the increasing data availability at the micro-level, there is a rich body of existing
studies on the impact evaluation of development policies respect to both the compre-
hensive gains and benefit for targeted regions/sectors/people. However, for the policy
side effects to non-targeted regions/sectors/people, empirical studies evaluating the im-
pact are still far from adequate, and conclusive. Further, the development experience
in China, as the largest developing economies, is a good reference for the policy-makers
in other developing countries, suggesting the impact evaluation of China’s development
policies is important. This research thus contributes to the existing empirical studies on
the impact evaluation of China’s development policies by focusing on the non-targeted
regions and sectors. Particularly, this dissertation gives a large body of discussions in
the scope of space, namely, it is concerned about the heterogeneity of program impact
on the distribution of economic activities, to present the dynamic evolution of economic
geography with respect to development policies.
This dissertation consists of three parts, which is a collection of three independent essays
in empirical impact evaluations on development policies and economic geography in
China, precisely, examination of the (positive) side effects of China’s three national
development policies. It focuses on three kinds of stylized regions and investigates their
regional development with respect to development policies: peripheral regions (rural
counties/county-level cities) and highway network building, border regions (Xinjiang,
the gateway of China and Central Asia) and railway speed-up project, natural resource-
intensive regions (regions with rich coal mine endowment) and coal mine regulation.
Specifically, the first part centers on the highway placement for non-targeted counties,
for which the industrial development is positively affected by the side effects of national
highway network building. The second part involves the speed-up of China’s West-East
railway lines and its side effects to China-Central Asia exports, it examines the two-
fold effects of exogenous domestic transport improvements on export performance. The
last part discusses the coal mine regulation and its direct/indirect impacts to economic
growth. Coal mine regulation is targeted only for the coal mining sector, however,
its crowding-out effects to capital and entrepreneurs, from coal mining sector to other
sectors, positively promote local economy in both coal mining sector and other sectors.
The methodology in this dissertation is based on econometrical and statistical tools, pre-
cisely, OLS estimation, difference-in-difference estimation, and propensity score match-
ing estimation, using various datasets. The dissertation designs and sets up related
transport infrastructure placement and policy change as quasi-experiments to conduct
quantitative analysis and observe heterogeneous impacts among regions and sectors.
The following is an overview of the chapters.
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In Chapter 2, we estimate how highways (Gaosu Gonglu) affected industrial development
in China’s rural regions between 1998 and 2007, a period in which China experienced
sharp growth in highway mileage. Highway routes between large cities pass through some
rural counties, but not others. Based on this exogeneity of rural counties to highway
routes (i.e., counties’ highway connection status), we conduct a difference-in-difference
propensity score matching (DID-PSM) estimation using counties’ highway connection
status and their industrial performance before and after being connected to a highway
as treatment variables. Our empirical estimates indicate that highway access promotes
industrial development in those counties with a higher output and greater level of invest-
ment. However, counties that are more than 300 km away from the large cities do not
benefit from highway connections. Furthermore, highways tend to promote the develop-
ment of heavy industry over light industry in rural regions. Labor productivity exhibits
few positive effects. Finally, we investigate the source of the estimated highway effects.
We find that they are the result of the net spillover from building the infrastructure,
and not because a county is a substitute for its unconnected neighbors.
Chapter 3 focuses on the impact evaluation of railway speed-up project on export per-
formance. China’s main railway line, linking the east and the west, was sped-up on
Oct. 21, 2000, which improved freight efficiency between Eastern China and Xinjiang
(the gateway from China to Central Asia). This chapter tests the impact of exoge-
nous domestic accessibility variation on China’s exports to Central Asia. By employing
a transaction-level database, empirical results find that benefited exporters (using rail
freight) increase the export value by 30%, compared with exporters using other freight
modes. The speed-up effect is due to mixed channels: net export creation, and export di-
version in freight modes and exporters. Exports of medium-value products benefit most.
Increase in export is exerted by export expansion of existing exporters, not by new en-
tries. Additionally, on the exports of Xinjiang, the speed-up effect is two-fold. Speed-up
weakens Xinjiang’s locational advantage in China-Central Asia trade, but promotes its
export to other international markets through better accessibility to the coast.
Finally, we turn to the economic development of resource-based regions in Chapter
4. In response to high mortality rates and low productivity in coal mining, China
began regulating coal mines in the 1990s, reshaping its coal economy. We empirically
investigate the relationship between coal mine regulation and economic growth in China.
Using two difference-in-difference approaches to compare the pre- and post-regulation
periods as well as regions heavily/lightly affected by regulatory policy, we find that
regulation positively affects regional economy. This result is further illustrated using
an OLS estimation that uses mortality rates in coal mining as a proxy for measuring
the quality of regulation. The effects are not limited to the intra-coal industry but also
apply to the economic spillover of related regions by relieving the crowding-out effects
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of coal abundance; that is, resource abundance tends to crowd out investment, human
capital, and innovation in non-resource sectors and thus hinders economic growth.
Chapter 2
Highways and Industrial
Development in Rural China1
2.1 Introduction
China built its first limited-access highway (Gaosu Gonglu)2 in 1988, and since then,
has experienced a dramatic increase in highway mileage. By the end of 2011, the total
highway mileage reached 85,000 km, giving China the second-longest highway system in
the world (see in Figure 2.1). Compared to ordinary roads, highways have advantages in
terms of road quality, congestion, and driving speed limits, which make transportation
more efficient. It is widely accepted that transport matters to industry location and
economic development, since economic development is much more dependent on cross-
border and inter-regional trade now than in any period in history. This makes the case
for an empirical investigation of highway effects, because highway networks play a core
role in reducing shipping costs and improving transport efficiency. Furthermore, during
the process of rapid industrialization, developing economies such as China built most of
their highway networks in the past two decades. This setting provides an opportunity to
observe and assess the effects of road improvements on social and economic development
in a modern emerging economy.
1This is a joint-work with Kentaro Nakajima. We thank Ching-mu Chen, Dao-Zhi Zeng, Shiro Hioki,
Sho-ichiro Nakayama, Makoto Tsukai, Chishio Furukawa, Ruixiang Xiong, Zhigang Li, Zheng Michael
Song, Dennis Tao Yang, Ming Lu, Zhao Chen, Hao Zhou, and Xiaoma Tao, as well as the participants
of ARSC (Aomori), CEAC (Shandong), the JEA Spring Meeting (Toyama), YES-China (Jinan), CCE
(Fudan), and seminars at Tohoku University and Tongji University for their many valuable comments
that have significantly improved this research. We also gratefully acknowledge the financial support
from the Graduate School of Economics, Tohoku University, Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
(#22223003, #25380275, #24330072) and the 21st Century Cultural and Academic Foundation. All
errors are ours.
2We refer to a limited-access highway simply as a highway in this chapter.
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Given this background, we quantitatively investigate the role of highway placement
on rural industrial development. Access to China’s micro-level industry and highway
placement databases allows us to estimate the impact of the highway infrastructure on
economic and social development in the period 1998 to 2007, during which most of
the major highway network was developed. Then, by distinguishing between counties
with and without highway access, we use the difference-in-difference propensity score
matching (DID-PSM) method to compare the industrial performance of these two kinds
of counties. Focusing on China’s rural counties3, we find that newly placed highways
stimulate industrial growth in connected counties that have a greater level of investment
and a higher output.
The DID-PSM results are robust to a placebo test involving those counties with no high-
ways in our research period (1998–2005). The test compares the industrial performance
of the counties that still had no highways in the subsequent period, 2006–2011, to the
performance of those counties that planned to have highways in the period 2006–2011
(planned highway cities). Our results show there is no highway effect between these two
kinds of counties during the research period, which partially controls the self-selection
problem between highway placement and industrial performance. As an alternative con-
trol mechanism, we enter the propensity score into the OLS regression investigating the
highway effects. After controlling for the propensity score, we find that highway con-
nections positively affect industrial performance, which is consistent with the DID-PSM
results.
Furthermore, highway density is also positively correlated with industrial performance.
In addition, we find that remote counties (i.e., counties more than 300 km from large
cities) do not benefit from newly placed highways and that highway access promotes the
development of heavy industry over that of light industry. These results suggest that
highway effects depend heavily on geographical location and industry type. Finally,
we investigate the source of the estimated highway effects, and find that they are the
result of the net spillover from building the infrastructure, and not because a county is
a substitute for its unconnected neighbors.
This study contributes to the existing literature in two respects. First, we develop
a new way of identifying highway accessibility. Here, we view highway toll stations
as indicating physical access to highways. In China, all vehicles must pay to use the
highway (Gaosu Gonglu) system, and this is managed by having a toll station at every
highway access point. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply this idea
to an empirical study. We define a county as being connected to the highway system
3We consider county-level cities (e.g., Xianjishi) and counties (e.g., Xian) to be equivalent in this
research, as per Qin (2014).
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Figure 2.1: Mileage of highways in China
if there is at least one highway toll station located within in its borders. Second, we
employ a careful strategy to make causal inferences about highway treatment effects,
using the experimentalist approach toward highway issues. Here, we use the propensity
score matching method and construct a placebo test to check for potential counterfactual
economic effects in the absence of highway access.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 contains a brief review
of issues related to transport and regional development. In Section 2.3, we present our
empirical strategy and a description of the data set. Section 2.4 gives the baseline results
and robustness checks, and Section 2.5 provides further estimates of the highway effects.
Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Transport infrastructure and regional development
There has been a considerable amount of theoretical research on the role of transport
infrastructure in promoting social and economic development. Along with imperfect
competition and economies of scale, changing transport costs affect the locations of
firms and workers (Krugman, 1991; Fujita, Krugman, and Venables, 1999). On the
other hand, because of decreasing transport costs and the increasing importance of non-
material flows, others doubt the importance of transport infrastructure to firm location
(Banister and Berechman, 2000). In addition, the distribution of the benefits from
infrastructure investment is not clear once we assume mobility of firms (Venables, 1996;
Puga, 1999).
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Empirically, Chandra and Thompson (2000) find that highways have a differential im-
pact across industries: certain industries grow as a result of reduced transportation
costs, while others shrink as economic activity relocates elsewhere. Boarnet (1998) find
that infrastructure investment (i.e., street-and-highway investment) has positive output
spillover effects within the same county and negative output spillover effects in other
counties. Holl (2004a, 2004b) proves that new firms prefer locations close to new mo-
torways in Spain and Portugal. Rephann and Isserman (1994) examine the effects of
interstate highways on counties in the U.S., and find that the areas that benefited most
are those in close proximity to large cities or with some degree of prior urbanization.
Furthermore, population and tertiary industry are affected most by highways, while
manufacturing is least affected. Rothenberg (2011) suggests that road improvements
are accompanied by a significant dispersion of manufacturing activity in Indonesia.
The empirical literature on China’s transport infrastructure construction and its effects
on social and economic development is still inconclusive. Baum-Snow et al. (2012) and
Baum-Snow and Turner (2012) explore the decentralization effects of highways on the
urban population in the core cities of prefectures. Banerjee, Duflo, and Qian (2012)
show that proximity to transportation networks has a moderate, positive causal effect
on per capita GDP levels across sectors, but no effect on per capita GDP growth.
Roberts et al. (2012) find that aggregate Chinese real income was approximately 6%
higher than it would have been in 2007 without the highway network. Faber (2014)
investigates the effects of highways on industrial performance and finds that, relative to
core regions, highways have a negative effect on the connected peripheral regions. Xu
and Zhou (2014) find highway connections help attract new firms in rural China and
that this effect results from a net spillover, and not because a county is a substitute for
its unconnected neighbors. In summary, evidence from previous research consistently
indicates that transport infrastructure has a significant effect on economic development.
2.3 Empirical strategy and data
2.3.1 Empirical strategy
If road improvements affect economic performance, then there will be a difference in
performance between regions with and without highway access in the long run. Thus,
we first need to develop a strategy to identify road accessibility. Many studies have been
forced to work with partial proxies, such as the road distance to the nearest interstate
highway (highway) (e.g., Baum-Snow, 2007; Holl, 2004b), the number of highway “rays”
emanating from central cities (e.g., Baum-Snow et al., 2012), the shortest travel time
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to places of work (e.g., Sanchis-Guarner and Lyytika¨inen, 2011), binary variables that
capture the presence of an airport or a port (e.g., Costa-Campi and Viladecans-Marsal,
1999), and regional transport infrastructure density (e.g., Nicolini, 2003). In this study,
we identify highway accessibility using highway toll stations. A payment is required to
access all highways in China. Vehicles access a highway through a toll station, making
toll stations a straightforward approximation of highway placement and highway access.
Second, we are concerned about the self-selection problem in highway placement. A
highway route is not usually designed and constructed at random. Instead, it depends
on social production, regional trade, national defense, political issues, existing principal
truck roads, and so on (see Rietveld and Bruinsma, 1998; Holl, 2004a; Baum-Snow,
2007). Thus, most empirical research on highway construction faces the self-selection
problem. Regions with highway access usually dominate other regions in many other
aspects, so even without highway access, such regions would still exhibit better economic
performance because of advantages in political status, geographical location, population
density, or similar factors. As a result, instruments such as historical highway planning,
historical road lines, and geographical features (e.g., elevation range, terrain ruggedness,
groundwater) are used as a source of exogenous variation to relieve the bias (e.g., Baum-
Snow, 2007; Baum-Snow et al., 2012; Duranton and Turner, 2012; Faber, 2014).
A sensible instrument is often hard to find, and weak instruments cannot efficiently
eliminate the bias. However, when the self-selection is based on observable factors, the
methods available for controlling the selection bias are relatively straightforward (Zhao,
2004). Counterfactual analysis by matching selects treated and comparison observations
with similar covariates to correct the selection bias, and may be efficient. When focusing
on micro county-level samples, it is feasible to construct balanced treated and comparison
observations by conducting a counterfactual analysis, since highway placement at this
level is supposed to be exogenous. Highways are always built to enable quick and
efficient movement between large cities, so smaller counties tend not to have a say in
the placement or shape of a highway route.
Evidence from previous research is informative on this assumption. Motorway project
placements can be assumed to be exogenous to changes at the municipality level, because
such decisions are mainly determined by factors and forces above the local level (Rietveld
and Bruinsma, 1998). Sanchis-Guarner and Lyytika¨inen (2011) point out that transport
projects are aimed at a higher spatial scale to improve safety or reduce congestion within
a wider area, and are not aimed at specific individuals or wards (a ward is a micro
administration unit, and there are 10,500 wards in Great Britain). Holl (2004a) and
Donaldson (2014) provide similar evidence for India’s railroads and Spain’s motorways,
respectively. As a result, whether small geographical units such as wards and counties are
Chapter 2. Highways and Industrial Development in Rural China 10
connected by highways might be determined by exogenous factors such as geographical
location.
To achieve the counterfactual analysis, we apply propensity score matching. First, we
select covariates that affect both highway treatment participation and the potential eco-
nomic/industrial outcome. Although we assume that highway placement at the county
level does not depend on the local economic/industrial situation, some economy, indus-
try, or population covariates can, to some extent, predict the probability of highway
placement. Then, we run a probit regression using highway treatment as the dependent
variable (1: if the county has access to highways; 0: if it does not) and the selected
related covariates as independent variables. Then, the predicted value from the pro-
bit regression becomes the propensity score (0 <propensity score <1). Based on the
propensity score of each sample county, the PSM method matches each treated highway
county with the most similar control counties (weighted).
The estimation technique that receives the most attention in PSM evaluation literature
is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) technique, which is defined as
ATT = E[Y1 − Y0|D = 1] = E[Y1|D = 1]− E[Y0|D = 0] + E[Y0|D = 0]− E[Y0|D = 1],
where D is a dummy variable for the treatment (D = 1: treated; D = 0: control), and
Yi represents the outcome indicator (Y1: the outcome if it is treated; Y0: the outcome if
it is a control). PSM aims to ensure that the selection bias goes to 0 after conditioning
on the propensity score, so that the counterfactual part, E[Y0|D = 1], can be dropped
in the ATT estimation:
E[Y0|D = 0, P (X)]− E[Y0|D = 1, P (X)] = 0,
where P (X) is the propensity score with covariate X. Therefore, given that the required
assumptions hold, the post-PSM ATT estimator can be written as
ATT (PSM) = E[Y1|D = 1, P (X)]− E[Y0|D = 0, P (X)].
This is the preferred form, and can be estimated directly using the observable data.
Smith and Todd (2005) find that the difference-in-difference propensity score matching
(DID-PSM) estimate is more robust than traditional cross-section matching estimators.
As such, we apply the DID estimate to the PSM estimate to construct a modified
estimation strategy. Specifically, we set Yi,j as the output of county j at time i (i=0:
pre-highway treatment, i=1: post-highway treatment; j=0: control county, j= 1: county
gained highway access at time 1). The DID highway treatment effect is estimated as
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follows:
Highway effect (DID) =
E[Y1,1 − Y0,1|D = 1, P (X)]− E[Y1,0 − Y0,0|D = 0, P (X)]
E[Y1,0 − Y0,0|D = 0, P (X)] .
In addition, to check whether the required assumption is satisfied in the PSM estimate,
we present the pre-treatment difference estimation. Based on the above discussion, we
know that if PSM relieves the selection bias well, then conditional on the propensity
score, the pre-treatment difference between a treated highway county and a control
county is expected to go to 0, since neither had the treatment at the beginning (i=0);
that is,
Pre-treatment difference =
E[Y0,1|D = 1, P (X)]− E[Y0,0|D = 0, P (X)]
E[Y0,0|D = 0, P (X)] = 0.
Furthermore, based on the same PSM strategy with respect to the highway effect (DID)
and pre-treatment difference, we conduct a placebo test by applying alternative matching
samples. That is, we test whether the estimated highway effects (DID) are also observed
in the absence of highway placement. This strategy might relieve the self-selection
problem in highway placement.
2.3.2 Data
The existing highway network in China was mainly undertaken based on two national
highway plans. The first was issued in 1992 and called the 5-Zong-7-Heng National
Trunk Highway System, and included five longitudinal lines and seven latitudinal lines.
The planned length was 34,422 km. This plan aimed to connect the hubs, main ports,
all cities with a population above one million, and most of the cities with a population
above 500,000. This plan was completed by the end of 2007. The second extension
plan, called the National Highway System Planned 7918 Highway Network, was issued
in 2004. This plan aimed to extend the first plan by shaping the final national highway
network with seven capital lines, nine longitudinal lines, and 18 latitudinal lines. The
planned mileage of the main body was 85,000 km. Maps of these two highway plans are
presented in Figures A.1 and A.2. The finished part of the second plan, together with
the provincial highways, connection lines, and ring lines of large cities, form China’s
current highway network.
We chose the county as the basic geographical unit to construct treatment and control
observations with a sufficient sample size. In China, the county is fourth in the hierarchy
of administration units, following the central government, provincial unit, and prefecture
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Provinces Provincial cities 
Prefectures Capital of provinces  
Counties Core districts 
Central government First level 
Second level 
Third level 
Fourth level 
Related to 
this paper 
Figure 2.2: Geographic units of mainland China related to this study
unit (see Figure 2.2). As a result, our samples are able to indicate the rural regions in
China.
County-level socio-economic and highway data used in this analysis come from several
sources.
(1) We collected the highway toll station data from the provincial public travel informa-
tion service system, and geo-coded the location at the county-level. In China, all vehicles
must pay to use the highway (Gaosu Gonglu) system. Thus, highway toll stations indi-
cate highway placement and highway access. This data set includes all toll stations that
can be geo-coded by Google Maps (updated to May 2012) in the designated provinces.
In addition, a small number of ordinary roads are also subject to road tolls, although
these were not included in the data set. Any county with at least one highway toll
station within its borders is classified as a highway county (i.e., a county with access to
a highway).
(2) Although the first highway was built in 1988, micro-level data in that period is not
readily available. The earliest available micro-level industry data set is the Chinese
Industry Statistical Database (CISD) from 1998. The CISD includes all state-owned
industrial firms and other industrial firms with annual sales of more than five million
Chinese Yuan. In addition, China’s market economy gained momentum in 1997, when
the 15th Congress of the Communist Party of China officially endorsed an increase in
the role of private firms in the economy (Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2011). Thus,
we set 1998 is as the starting point for the analysis. For precision, we exclude counties
with highway placement before 1998 in the following analysis. After 2007, the CISD
no longer reports on firm-level annual value-added, so this date marks the end of our
analysis. China’s highways experienced significant development between 1998 and 2007,
growing from 8,733 km to 53,913 km. Therefore, we assume that they had a significant
economic impact on related regions.
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(3) Population data come from the 5th national population census at the county-level,
which recorded the population, level of education, and employment status at the end of
2000.
(4) GDP and per capita GDP data at the county-level come from the Provincial Statis-
tical Yearbooks of the designated years.
We merged the data sets based on the unique administrative division code (Xinzheng
Quhua Daima). County-level units in all data sets are corrected to match the 1998
administrative divisions. To compare real growth in GDP/per capita GDP, industrial
output (value-added), and investment (net value of fixed assets) in an industry, we use
the provincial-level consumer price index, the producer price index for manufactured
goods, and the price index for the net value of fixed assets, respectively, to deflate
the nominal value in 2007. The indices are taken from the price indices section of the
annual China Statistical Yearbook. We assume comparability among provinces based
on nominal prices in the base year, 1998.
Specifically, we choose the sample counties in four steps. First, we exclude counties
in 11 provinces because of data restrictions. Second, counties in the four provincial
counties (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing) and all provincial capitals are
excluded. These large counties have a much higher highway density because of policy
and economic superiority. Their social and economic characteristics are also different
from other cities. On the other hand, counties in these areas tend to be affected by the
spillover effects of the large cities and urban sprawl. Finally, we exclude all counties in
prefectures that had highway access before 1998. The related data come from Gonglu
(a journal on traffic studies in Chinese; see 2002(4): 132-140), which summarizes the
progress of China’s highways from 1988 to 2001.
To achieve the empirical procedures in the following sections, we further divide the
sample counties into three categories:
∗ highway counties: gained access to highways between 1998 and 2005;
∗ planned highway counties: gained access to highways between 2006 and 2011;
∗ control counties: no highway access as of the end of 2011.
Figure 2.3 and A.2 show that highways are denser in the coastal regions (Eastern China)
than in the inland regions (Western and Central China). Most of the sample counties in
the coastal regions have highway access. This is not strange based on China’s economic
geography. The coastal regions have a higher population and economic density. Thus,
we further divide the samples into two sub-groups: coastal regions and inland regions,
and perform the matching separately. Following the traditional classification of China’s
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Figure 2.3: Selected county samples from the matching procedure
Note: Green units: highway counties; red units: planned highway counties; orange units: control coun-
ties. Distinguishing between highway counties and planned highway counties is achieved using the
digitalized map of China’s highway lines in 2005 from Baum-Snow and Turner (2012) and the Geo-
referencing module of ArcGIS.
economic geography, we define six of the 16 sample provinces as coastal regions (Zhe-
jiang, Jiangsu, Fujian, Guangdong, Liaoning, and Hebei) and the remaining 10 sample
provinces as inland regions (Jilin, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hu’nan, Guangxi, Gansu, Shanxi,
Sichuan, Guizhou, and He’nan). The final prepared sample consists of 983 counties be-
longing to 16 provinces, accounting for 36.4% of the Chinese population (5th national
population census in 2000), and 12.2% of national industrial output (value-added) in
1998. In 2007, the latter figure increases slightly to 12.6%.
2.4 Baseline results and robustness checks
2.4.1 Baseline results
As mentioned in Section 3, we have data on the highway building status for two years,
1998 and 2005, and industrial outcome information for two years, 1998 and 2007. We
assume that the period from 2005 to 2007 is the lag for the industry to respond to
the recently gained highway access, so we set the post-treatment data set to 2007, and
identify highway counties based on their highway placement status at the end of 2005.
The highway data set does not include the precise date each toll station was installed,
so it is not possible to estimate the average yearly highway effect per industry. As a
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compromise, we compare the difference in the total growth from 1998 to 2007 between
the treated and control counties using the DID-PSM method. We choose covariates that
may affect regional development and transport infrastructure placement, based on prior
literature, and decide on the final number and form (such as intersection and logarithm)
of the covariates based on three criteria. First, we require a sufficiently high predictive
value from the propensity score for the actual placement in the samples (Heckman et al.,
1998). Second, the conditional independence assumption (CIA) based on the propensity
score should be satisfied. Specifically, the post-matching samples should have a smaller
pseudo R2 than the pre-matching samples, so that the covariates are no longer able to
provide new information about treatment participation conditional on the calculated
propensity score. Third, the difference in the covariates between the treated and post-
matching control samples should be insignificant. In addition, to apply PSM without
bias, the covariates used in the matching should either be fixed over time or measured
before participation in the treatment.
Although highway planning and building are not subject to population and economic
development at the county level, the population, economic, and geographical character-
istics of the counties are good predictors of highway placement. Specifically, we choose
nine covariates on population density, initial per capita GDP, location, et al., and apply
these to the propensity score calculation. The first stage of the DID-PSM estimation is
as shown in Equation 2.1, which provides the propensity score for each county. Here,
Dummy for highway is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for highway counties
and planned highway counties, and 0 for control counties. The results are presented in
Table 2.1 (the descriptive summary for these nine covariates are presented in Table A.1).
Dummy for highwayi = Probit(area sizei, pop.dens.i, initial p.c.GDPi, et al.) + i. (2.1)
We find that covariates matter more to the highway status in inland regions than in
coastal regions. Furthermore, in both regions, highway counties have, on average, a
lower share of tertiary industries. For coastal regions, highway counties tend to be
closer to large ports. For inland regions, highway counties tend to have a higher initial
per capita GDP, higher population density, and higher share of secondary industries.
The propensity score is then obtained by Equation 2.2, where ˜i are the estimated
residuals from Equation 2.1. We use the fraction of treated subjects (including both
highway and planned highway counties) in the total number of observations as the
cutoff value for the predicted probability. The cutoff values for our sample are 0.6055 for
coastal counties and 0.3907 for inland counties. Using these cutoff values, the prediction
rates for the treated and control observations are 65.2% and 60.4% in coastal county
groups, and 90.9% and 52.0% in inland county groups, respectively. Using the same
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Table 2.1: First stage results (Probit regression)
(1) (2)
Dummy for highway Dummy for highway
Area size 0.0001 -0.0000
(1.06) (-1.61)
Minimum distance to large cities -0.0010 0.0002
(-0.75) (0.57)
Minimum distance to large ports 0.0016** -0.0004**
(1.98) (-2.38)
Employment share of secondary sector 1.0493 2.9835**
(0.83) (2.32)
Employment share of tertiary sector -4.1602** -3.2001**
(-2.24) (-2.01)
Firm density 2.8372 0.2824
(1.14) (0.10)
Population density 0.0006 0.0009***
(1.11) (2.78)
Population share (education>high school) 2.1627 1.1818
(0.68) (0.57)
Initial per capita GDP 0.1044 0.6837***
(0.47) (4.88)
Constant -1.0611 -5.3759***
(-0.55) (-4.99)
Region Coastal Inland
No. obs. 276 707
Pseudo R2 0.0559 0.1287
Note: Z -values in parentheses: **, *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
propensity score calculation, we find in Figure A.3 that both highway counties and
planned highway counties are easily distinguished from control counties. The mean of
the related probability for the treatment (propensity score) is greater in treated highway
counties than in control counties. Thus, the propensity score is a suitable predictor of
actual treatment participation.
Propensity Scorei = Dummy for highwayi − ˜i. (2.2)
Then, the matched pseudo R2 is presented for each PSM treatment effect estimate in
Tables 2.2, 2.3, 2.7, 2.8, and 2.9. We can see a satisfactory reduction in the pseudo R2
between the raw and matched samples. Furthermore, the covariate bias (%) is reduced,
and most covariates show no significant difference between the treated and post-matching
control groups, even at the 10% confidence level. Detailed information is presented in
Table A.3. Thus, we can assume that the covariates are highly correlated with both
the participation indicator (highway placement) and industrial development, which is a
requirement for applying PSM.
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In the second stage of DID-PSM, we set the outcome growth (Growthi) as the difference-
in-difference with respect to the growth in 1998–2007 and the matched control observa-
tions. Here, Growthi is defined in Equation 2.3. Outcome indicators refer to the per
capita GDP of the overall economy, and the firm density, investment (net value of fixed
assets), and output (value-added) per industry. Then, ∆Outcomei reflects the growth
in absolute value for treated county i, and ∆Outcomematchedcontrol,i shows the growth
in absolute value for the control county matched to county i. We perform the matching
using kernel matching algorithms. As a result, the related control county is a weighted
average of many control counties. In other words, it represents a pseudo county rather
than an actual county.
Growthi = ∆Outcomei/∆Outcomematchedcontrol,i − 1. (2.3)
Pre-treatmenti = Outcome1998i/Outcome1998matchedcontrol,i − 1. (2.4)
The number of treated counties is set to A, and each treated county is numbered as
A = {1, 2, ..., A}. We then test whether the obtained Growth={Growthi|i ∈ A} and
0 are significantly different. If Growth is significantly different to 0 and positive, we
interpret this as showing positive highway effects. To relieve the limitation caused by the
sample size, we report the significance using bootstrapped standard errors (200 times).
This strategy also applies in the following DID-PSM estimations. As a reference, we
also test whether Pre-treatment (as in Equation 2.4) and 0 are significantly different.
Here, Pre-treatment is symmetrical with Growth, but we replace the growth between
1998–2007, ∆Outcomei, with the initial value in 1998, Outcome1998i. Since we test the
post-matching difference, the pre-treatment difference between the treated and control
samples should be nonsignificant. Therefore, we test whether the difference between
Pre-treatment and 0 is nonsignificant.
Table 2.2 gives the estimates of the highway effect (DID) and pre-treatment difference
for four county-level outcome indicators (see the descriptive statistics in Table A.2): per
capita GDP and the industrial performance indicators (firm density, investment, and
output). In the first four columns of panel A, we report the DID results for four indicators
for coastal regions and the last four columns show the results for the inland regions.
Then, as a reference, we present the pre-treatment differences (i.e., the estimations from
Equation 2.4) in Panel B. For both the coastal and inland regions, the indicators of
output and investment in industry show significant treatment effects relative to their
pre-treatment values. For example, in 1998 (before treatment), the average industrial
investment/output in the treated counties is 101.79%/118.67% of that in the control
counties, and the differences are nonsignificant. However, the DID results increase to
176.01%/139.58% and are significant at the 1%/5% confidence level. We also tested the
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results using radius matching algorithms rather than kernel matching algorithms, with
the results being highly consistent (results are available upon request). However, the
treatment effects on per capita GDP and firm density are nonsignificant. We explain
this result in the following sections.
Table 2.2: Estimation of highway treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in
p.c. GDP firm density investment output p.c. GDP firm density investment output
Panel A: Highway effects (difference-in-difference)
Highway 0.0829 0.0987 0.7601*** 0.3958** -0.0065 -0.1174 0.7230** 0.2818**
(0.75) (0.30) (2.90) (2.13) (-0.09) (-0.70) (2.36) (2.09)
Panel B: Pre-treatment difference
Highway 0.0947 0.1456 0.0179 0.1867 0.0365 0.2169* 0.0523 0.1259
(1.57) (1.06) (0.09) (1.28) (1.01) (1.80) (0.26) (0.84)
Description
Region Coastal Inland
No. matched obs.
(Treated/Control) 150/101 242/379
Pseudo R2
(Raw/Matched) 0.062/0.009 0.187/0.019
Note: Samples that do not satisfy the common support are dropped; Z -values in parentheses: *, **, ***
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
2.4.2 Placebo test
In the baseline highway treatment effect estimation, we control for the observable covari-
ates through PSM. However, the significant estimation results could be caused by the
disturbance of unobservable variables if such variables can affect both highway treat-
ment and industrial performance. In other words, this is the source of self-selection
problem, but we omitted them because of data restrictions. One possible test is to check
for a pseudo treatment effect using the same propensity score calculation and matching
strategy, but using planned highway counties (treated after 2005) rather than highway
counties (treated before 2005).
China continued its highway construction in the Eleventh Five-Year (2006–2010) period.
Its highway mileage was extended to more than 70,000 km in 2010 and reached 80,000
km by the end of 2011. This period saw more than 30,000 km of newly constructed
highways across the country, and many rural counties gained highway access for the
first time. In this respect, if the improved performance in highway counties presented in
Table 2.2 is indeed attributable to highway access, we can expect to find no significant
difference between planned highway counties and control counties. This is because,
in the period 1998–2005, planned highway counties had no highway access (they only
gained highway access in 2006–2011). If this is true, we can also prove that whether or
not gain access to a highway in the rural counties is not affected by their prior economic
performances. To maintain comparability, we use the same matching strategies as in the
baseline estimation.
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Table 2.3: Estimation of counterfactual highway treatment effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in
p.c. GDP firm density investment output p.c. GDP firm density investment output
Panel A: Highway effects (difference-in-difference)
Highway -0.1980 -0.1445 -0.2747 -0.1663 0.0337 -0.4250*** 1.0301 0.1055
(Pseudo) (-1.62) (-0.59) (-1.26) (-0.63) (0.32) (-2.89) (1.53) (0.67)
Panel B: Pre-treatment difference
Highway -0.1475* -0.3899** -0.2397 -0.0392 0.0037 0.1572 0.2741 0.1060
(Pseudo) (-1.73) (-2.18) (-0.79) (-0.15) (0.09) (1.21) (0.70) (0.53)
Description
Region Coastal Inland
No. matched obs.
(Treated/Control) 20/101 85/379
Pseudo R2
(Raw/Matched) 0.212/0.190 0.033/0.011
Note: Samples that do not satisfy the common support are dropped; Z -values in parentheses: *, **, ***
significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In Figure A.3, we can see that the propensity score is also able to distinguish between
planned highway counties and control counties. Here, the average propensity score of
planned highway counties is larger than that of control counties. The pseudo treatment
effect estimates are consistent with the above assumption. Compared to the results in
Table 2.2, the average difference between the industrial indicators in planned highway
counties and the control counties is much smaller. Almost all of the pre-treatment differ-
ences and DID values of the industrial indicators are nonsignificant (the only exceptions
being in firm density and per capita GDP, but their negative values are compatible with
our opinion). In addition, we tested the results using radius matching algorithms rather
than kernel matching algorithms, and the results were again similar (results are avail-
able upon request). For clarity, the trend in industrial output (value-added of industry)
between 1998 and 2007 is presented in Figure 2.4. Highway counties tend to have faster
growth in industry output than control counties, but planned highway counties show a
similar trend to control counties. For the coastal planned highway counties, the growth
in output is even slower than in the control counties. These figures are based on kernel
matching estimates in industrial output, but the results are highly consistent under ra-
dius matching or when using data on industrial investment. Similarly, in Table 2.3, we
do not find a significant difference in per capita GDP growth.4
2.4.3 OLS approach with propensity score
Our sample unit is the county in China. However, counties in China are divided into rural
counties (Xian) and county-level cities (Xianjishi). Owing to national urbanization,
4PSM has a shortcoming in that, when the sample size is too small, it does not perform well. On
the other hand, Mahalanobis distance matching (MDM) (see Rubin, 1980) is relatively robust under
different settings (Zhao, 2004). See also Rephann and Isserman (1994) for an application of MDM. We
thus also tested our baseline and placebo estimations using difference-in-difference Mahalanobis distance
matching, with the results remaining unchanged. These results are available upon request.
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Figure 2.4: Output (value-added) of industry in 1998 and 2007
Note: **: the difference in value-added between treatment and control groups is significant at the 5%
level. The monetary unit in the figures is one billion Yuan, after deflating the price index to 1998 values.
some counties with a high population density or that perform well economically play,
at least to some extent, the role of a city. These counties are called the Xianjishi. In
the DID-PSM estimation, we treat counties (Xian) and county-level cities (Xianjishi)
symmetrically (see also Qin (2014)) because matching them separately might cause
an insufficient sample size in a quasi-experiment. Although the heterogeneity between
Xian and Xianjishi might be reflected in the covariates we employ in the matching
process, it causes a potential disturbance in the randomness of highway placement.
Therefore, it might be informative if we were able to treat them separately. In addition,
counties with a single highway toll station and counties with multiple toll stations are
seen as equivalent in the DID-PSM estimations, which might lead to the omission of an
important variation. Counties with multiple toll stations have a higher highway density
than counties with single toll station, and the relationship between highway density and
industrial performance is informative.
PSM makes few assumptions about the nature of the relationship between the con-
founders and the outcome, which makes matching the preferred method of applying the
propensity score. However, when the sample size is not large enough and heterogeneity
among observations needs to be well controlled, matching in sub-samples is not efficient.
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As an alternative, entering the propensity score in a regression model for the outcome,
just as we would any independent variable, is another way to investigate the treatment
effects (see, Indurkhya, Mitra, and Schrag (2006); Basu, Polsky, and Manning (2008)).
More specifically, to further understand how highway density and the heterogeneity in
administrative units affect the estimates of highway effects, we run an OLS regression
while controlling for the features of the Xianjishi and highway density.
First, we employ the growth rate of four output indicators in the period 1998–2007 as the
dependent variable (ln (Growth)=ln (Outcome2007 )-ln (Outcome1998 )), the propensity
score as the independent variable, and two dummy variables: Highway (takes the value
1 if there is at least one highway toll station in the area in the specific period); Xianjishi
(takes the value 1 if it is a Xianjishi, 0 if it is a Xian). To control the initial output
difference among counties, we insert the related initial values, η, as the fixed effects of a
province or prefecture:
ln(Growthi) = α0 + α1Highwayi + α2Propensity Scorei + α3Xianjishii + a4Initiali + ηi + i.
(2.5)
The results are presented in Table 2.4. Note that we only show the results for industrial
investment and output because the results for per capita GDP and industrial firm den-
sity are all nonsignificant (results are available upon request). In the first four columns,
we estimate the highway effects of the outcome indicators using the full sample. The
highway98–05 dummy variable is set to 1 for highway counties (counties that obtained
a highway during the period 1998–2005)and 0 for planned highway counties and control
counties. In columns 5–8, we run the same regression, but only include the planned
highway counties (counties that obtained a highway during the period 2006–2011) and
control counties (excluding those counties that had gained highway access by the end of
2005). Here, the highway06–11 dummy variable is set to 1 for planned highway counties
and 0 for control counties. The results for highway effects are consistent with the baseline
results. A significant highway effect on industrial investment and output is observed in
columns 1–4 with province and prefecture fixed effects. However, in the counterfactual
regression (column 5–8), the coefficients for the highway06–11 dummy are nonsignifi-
cant. The Xianjishi dummy captures the variation caused by sample heterogeneity, but
the results are nonsignificant in all cases. We also find in most of the cases that the
coefficients of the propensity score in Table 2.4 are significant at the 1% level. This
suggests that the propensity score does well in controlling some of the factors that affect
industrial performance. Baum-Snow et al. (2012) find that their instrumental variable
(IV) decreases the effects of highways. This is consistent with the fact that highways
tend to be located in places with better unobservables. Similarly, to ascertain whether
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the propensity score effectively corrects some endogeneity problems, we run the regres-
sion without controlling for the propensity score. The results show that the propensity
score, like the IV in Baum-Snow et al. (2012), decreases the effects of highways. The
coefficients for growth in industrial investment and output decreased after controlling
for the propensity score. For example, in column 1 the relevant coefficient increased
from 0.203 to 0.258 without the control for the propensity score, and in column 3 the
coefficient increased from 0.167 to 0.220. In both cases, the level of significance remained
at the 1% level (detailed results are available upon request).
Table 2.4: OLS regression with propensity score and highway dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (Growth in output) ln (Growth in investment) ln (Growth in output) ln (Growth in investment)
Highway98–05 0.203*** 0.179*** 0.167*** 0.168**
(3.38) (3.05) (2.59) (2.39)
Highway06–11 -0.049 -0.132 0.022 0.079
(-0.46) (-1.09) (0.19) (0.54)
Propensity Score 1.608*** 1.246*** 1.269*** 1.131*** 1.970*** 1.499** 1.365*** 1.341*
(5.44) (3.50) (4.20) (2.75) (4.72) (2.53) (3.13) (1.96)
Xianjishi 0.091 0.091 0.109 0.153 0.056 0.025 0.118 0.140
(1.12) (1.17) (1.25) (1.63) (0.41) (0.17) (0.81) (0.78)
ln (output initial) -0.415*** -0.413*** -0.397*** -0.414***
(-13.39) (-13.00) (-9.64) (-8.89)
ln (invest. initial) -0.401*** -0.410*** -0.403*** -0.422***
(-12.24) (-11.07) (-9.12) (-7.81)
Constant 5.296*** 6.062*** 5.215*** 5.983*** 5.083*** 6.492*** 5.330*** 6.613***
(16.45) (14.22) (14.15) (11.39) (11.24) (8.31) (10.23) (7.00)
Sample All All All All Planned& Planned& Planned& Planned&
Control Control Control Control
Province F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 910 910 913 913 540 540 541 541
R2 0.273 0.526 0.211 0.360 0.252 0.527 0.190 0.373
Note: T -values in parentheses: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respec-
tively.
For some counties, the outcome information in 1998 in related industrial outcome indicators (investment
and output) is 0. This means we were not able to calculate the growth rate, which led to a reduced
sample size. Note that this also applies to Table 2.6.
Second, we run the regression again using the number of toll stations (count data) instead
of the highway dummy. The equation is as follows:
ln(Growthi) = α0 + α1 ln(number of toll stationi) + α2Propensity Scorei + α3Xianjishii
+α4Initiali + ηi + i.
(2.6)
In Table 2.5 we present the number of toll stations for our sample counties in 2011.
Since the related data from 2005 is not available, we use the data from 2011 as a proxy
for that of 2005. We assume a proportional growth in the number of toll stations for
the sample counties within the highway county group. However, this assumption is not
reasonable for the full sample because, for one highway line, counties connected in the
first period will not be connected again in next period. Within the highway county
samples, or within the planned highway and control county samples, we assume that
the probability of receiving new toll stations in the period 2006–2011 is proportional to
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Table 2.5: Number of highway toll stations in sample counties
Number of toll stations 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 >7
Number of highway counties 0 131 94 82 41 20 15 8 7
Number of planned highway counties 0 28 44 15 8 5 3 0 2
Number of control counties 480 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
the number of existing toll stations in 2005. Actually, for planned highway and control
county samples, they have no highway toll station before 2006. For most of the highway
counties and planned highway counties have 1–3 toll stations in 2011.
Table 6 presents our modified estimations. Unsurprisingly, highway density (number of
toll stations) has a positive relationship with industrial outcomes within the highway
county sample (columns 1–4), with the exception of column 2. After controlling for
prefecture fixed effects, the effects of highway density on growth in industrial output
become nonsignificant. In the robustness check, using only planned highway counties
(columns 5–8, the results of the counterfactual highway effects are nonsignificant, which
is consistent with previous estimations.
Table 2.6: OLS regression with propensity score and count data of toll stations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (Growth in output) ln (Growth in investment) ln (Growth in output) ln (Growth in investment)
ln (number of toll stations) 0.113** 0.0193 0.147** 0.122* 0.015 -0.131 0.276 0.288
(2.01) (0.32) (2.45) (1.74) (0.11) (-0.64) (1.34) (0.88)
Propensity Score 0.941** 0.363 1.059*** 0.499 1.716 0.882 2.510* 3.738
(2.34) (0.66) (2.66) (0.82) (1.63) (0.42) (1.72) (1.28)
Xianjishi 0.176* 0.177* 0.084 0.202 0.190 -0.127 0.145 0.017
(1.97) (1.68) (0.86) (1.64) (0.77) (-0.31) (0.38) (0.03)
ln (output initial) -0.488*** -0.425*** -0.361*** -0.224
(-10.18) (-7.49) (-3.56) (-1.30)
ln (invest. initial) -0.419*** -0.468*** -0.592*** -0.616***
(-8.45) (-7.47) (-5.44) (-3.40)
Constant 6.589*** 6.930*** 5.533*** 7.164*** 3.697*** 4.328*** 6.121*** 5.777**
(13.63) (9.87) (10.03) (8.47) (2.98) (3.06) (3.67) (2.15)
Sample Highway Highway Highway Highway Planned Planned Planned Planned
Province F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prefecture F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 370 370 372 372 96 96 96 96
R2 0.381 0.662 0.306 0.565 0.471 0.708 0.383 0.625
Note: T -values in parentheses: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respec-
tively.
2.5 Further estimates and discussion
2.5.1 Highway effects in different geographical locations
The effects of highways on regional development and industrial performance rely on
access to consumer and supplier markets. Xu et al. (2010) point out that scale effects
and other external economies related to spatial agglomeration drive large cities to absorb
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economic resources from their surroundings, which is a significant centripetal force.
Thus, the closer a city is to a central city, the faster the city grows. Xu et al. (2010)
estimate that the turning point for Chinese cities is 300 km. When the distance exceeds
300 km, a centrifugal force plays a major role. Rephann and Isserman (1994) also
find that the beneficiaries of new interstate highways in terms of economic growth are
interstate counties in close proximity to large cities. Highway access plays a role in
drawing connected cities closer because the average transport efficiency of a highway is
much higher than that of an ordinary road. Thus, we can expect that highways can help
bring cities closer, at least in the economic sense, to large cities. Therefore, we check
whether highway effects differ between counties with different distances to large cities.
From Table A.1, we can see that in the coastal regions, the average minimum distance
between a highway county and a large city is less than 200 km (see the “minimum
distance to large cities”), with most highway counties being close to large cities. The
average minimum distance for inland counties is 312 km, which is similar to the distance
(300 km) mentioned by Xu et al. (2010). As such, it is suitable to use only inland samples
to check for highway effects in different geographical locations. We divide the counties
into two groups, according to geographical location: close to or remote from large cities.
The cutoff is set at 300 km, and the control counties in the inland regions are also
divided into the same two groups using the same criterion. The related propensity score
distribution shows that the propensity score still performs well in predicting highway
placement (Figure A.4).
The DID-PSM results are presented in Table 2.7. The highway treatment effect is not
evident in those counties that are remote from large cities, as shown in columns 1–4.
However, the effect is highly positive and significant in counties close to large cities.
Evidently, counties close to large cities are more active in industrial activities. Columns
7 and 8 show that most industrial investment and output are nonsignificant before
treatment, but become significant after treatment. In addition, we still find no evidence
of highway effects on per capita GDP and firm density.
The centripetal and centrifugal forces mentioned by Xu et al. (2010) could explain the
results in Table 2.7, although there may also be some other underlying logic. Highway
construction always starts in large cities and then gradually extends to the peripheral
regions. That is, counties close to large cities tend to gain highway access sooner than
those that are more remote. Thus, in highway counties that are distant from large cities,
industrial performance needs more time to respond to highway access. However, this
explanation does not weaken the robustness of the estimated results for the planned
highway counties (Table 2.3). This is because the average minimum distance to large
cities among the inland planned highway counties is 306 km (see column 6 of Table A.1),
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Table 2.7: Estimation of highway treatment effects in different geographical locations
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in
p.c. GDP firm density investment output p.c. GDP firm density investment output
Panel A: Highway effects (difference-in-difference)
Highway 0.0084 -0.4072 0.3226 0.1473 -0.0207 0.1525 1.1681** 0.3183*
(0.08) (-1.43) (1.12) (0.77) (-0.24) (0.86) (2.42) (1.81)
Panel B: Pre-treatment difference
Highway 0.0276 0.1831 0.0958 0.2352* 0.0017 -0.0827 -0.1385 -0.0419
(0.54) (1.08) (0.43) (1.71) (0.03) (-0.44) (-0.49) (-0.18)
Description
Region Inland, Remote Inland, Close
No. matched obs.
(Treated/Control) 133/208 98/171
Pseudo R2
(Raw/Matched) 0.223/0.025 0.188/0.020
Note: Samples that do not satisfy the common support are dropped; Z -values in parentheses: *, **
indicate significance at the 10% and 5% levels, respectively.
which is less than that of highway counties (312 km). These nonsignificant estimates
are due to the absence of highway access before 2005, not the distance from large cities.
2.5.2 Highway effects on industry structure
Here, we examine the relationship between within-industry heterogeneity and highway
effects. The CISD classifies each firm-level record as either heavy industry or light indus-
try.5 Based on this classification, Table 2.8 shows that there is a significant difference in
highway effects, even in terms of the internal structure of an industry. Heavy industry
is heavily affected by highway access, but light industry is not. We find that highway
connections promote heavy industry in the inland counties (here we refer only to the
“close” samples, as described in Section 5.1, because the highway effects in “remote”
counties are weak), but that the effect of these connections on light industry is unclear.
For firm density, the results are all nonsignificant (the estimation results for coastal
counties are consistent with those of inland counties; results are available upon request).
This result is consistent with China’s process of industrialization. Although light indus-
try in China also developed rapidly in the period 1998–2007, heavy industry performed
as the pillar of the economy. In 1998, heavy industry accounted for 49% of all firms and
55% of the value-added of the national industry. By 2007, these figures had increased to
57% and 68%, respectively (China Statistical Yearbooks, 1999 & 2008). This suggests
that, in recent years, heavy industry has been more active than light industry in China,
and that the average firm size within heavy industry is larger than in light industry.
This could partly explain why the estimated growth of firm density in highway counties
is not as significant as the growth in investment and output. In addition, heavy industry
5Heavy industry refers to chemistry, general equipment, the steel industry, etc.; light industry refers
to textiles, food, the tobacco industry, etc.
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Table 2.8: Estimation of highway treatment effects within different industries
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in Growth in
firm density investment output firm density investment output
Panel A: Highway effects (difference-in-difference)
Highway 0.1276 0.1561 -0.0265 0.1647 1.6352** 0.5383**
(0.49) (0.56) (-0.12) (0.91) (2.36) (2.30)
Panel B: Pre-treatment difference
Highway -0.1569 -0.0066 -0.1086 0.0003 -0.1873 0.0121
(-0.74) (-0.03) (-0.43) (0.00) (-0.52) (0.04)
Description
Industry Light Heavy
Region Inland, Close
No. matched obs.
(Treated/Control) 98/171
Pseudo R2
(Raw/Matched) 0.188/0.020
Note: Z -values in parentheses: ** indicates significance at the 5% level.
is much more dependent on transport than light industry, and so will thus benefit more
from highway access.
Next, we estimate labor productivity and employment within industry. The indicator for
labor productivity in industry is nonsignificant, but is significant in terms of employment
(see Table 2.9). The significance of the treatment effects in employment could potentially
explain why highway counties have a higher industrial output and level of investment,
while at the same time, firm density does not increase. In other words, the average firm
size in highway counties tends to be larger than in control counties. The nonsignificant
results for labor productivity seem to be consistent with the nonsignificant results for
per capita GDP. Two factors may help interpret these findings. First, the CISD records
firm-level data according to the firm’s geographical location. However, in some cases, a
firm’s output may be attributed a higher administration unit rather than to the local
economy. This is particularly common for state-owned firms. Thus, the statistical rules
between the two data sets (industrial indicator and GDP indicator) are inconsistent.
Second, China’s regional convergence in economic development has been observed in
many prior studies. Using the growth (for the period 1998–2007) of per capita GDP as
the dependent variable and per capita GDP in 1998 as the independent variable, an OLS
estimate using the samples from this study gives a significant and negative coefficient
under different settings. Using the industrial structure, we also test whether highway
access promotes upgrading the industrial structure from that suited to a primary sector-
driven economy to that suited to a secondary sector-driven economy. However, the
results are unclear (results are available upon request).
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Table 2.9: Estimations using labor productivity and employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lab. Prod. Empl. Lab. Prod. Empl.
Highway effects (Post-treatment difference)
Highway 0.0323 0.4014*** -0.0059 0.2397**
(0.47) (2.69) (-0.07) (2.11)
Description
Region Coastal, All Inland, Close
No. matched obs.
(Treated/Control) 150/99 98/170
Pseudo R2
(Raw/Matched) 0.069/0.010 0.182/0.020
Note: Owing to data restrictions, we do not present the pre-treatment indicators for labor productivity
and employment within the industry (these two indicators are only available for firms in the CISD).
Z -values in parentheses: **, *** indicate significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
The description of the covariates is as follows:
Lab. Prod. (Labor productivity): per capita value-added (value-added divided by the number of employ-
ees in firms above the designated size);
Empl. (Employment): average number of employees in industrial firms above the designated size.
2.5.3 Net spillover effects or substitution effects?
As stated in Boarnet (1998), infrastructure investment has positive output spillover ef-
fects within the same county and negative output spillover effects in other counties.
This finding is relevant to the results of our identification strategy. Counties within a
prefecture have similar industrial policies and geographical proximity. As a result, for
highway connected counties, our estimated highway effects might stem from a county
being used as a substitute for its unconnected neighbors. In this case, the presence of
a highway does not promote industrial development in rural regions, instead having a
negative impact on unconnected counties. For a planned highway county or a control
county, if other counties within a prefecture are connected to a highway in the period
1998–2005, we refer to the planned highway county or control county as being spillovered
by its neighboring highway counties. We thus test the potential negative effects (i.e.,
the substitution effects) of highways on unconnected counties by comparing two kinds of
counties: (1) a county that did not receive a highway in 1998–2005, but within its pre-
fecture, at least one other county did receive a highway during this period (spillovered);
and (2) a county that did not receive a highway in the period 1998–2005, and no other
counties within its prefecture received highways either (unspillovered). In this estima-
tion we employ only the planned highway counties and control counties, and treat them
as equivalent. The estimation equation is as follows:
ln(Growthi) = α0 + α1Spillover + ηi + i. (2.7)
Here, Spillover refers to the county dummy (takes the value 1 for a county if there is at
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least one county within the prefecture that is connected to a highway in 1998–2005, and
0 otherwise). The results are presented in columns 1 and 3 of Table 2.10. The differ-
ence between spillovered and unspillovered counties is nonsignificant. Then we employ
another indicator instead of Spillover, namely the density of spillover, represented as
number of highway neighbors. Here, number of highway neighbors refers to the number
of highway counties within the same prefecture as the spillovered planned highway or
control county.6 The results in columns 2 and 4 remain unchanged. Furthermore, in
columns 5–8, we insert other controls for the Xianjishi dummy, namely the propensity
score and initial values. In both cases, the results are nonsignificant. This suggests that
the spillover effects from a highway county to neighboring counties, whether positive or
negative, are weak and unclear.7
Table 2.10: Estimation of the source of highway spillover effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln (Growth in output) ln (Growth in invest.) ln (Growth in output) ln (Growth in invest.)
Spillover -0.00 0.04 -0.04 -0.02
(-0.01) (0.31) (-0.37) (-0.20)
ln (number of highway 0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.00
neighbors+1) (0.29) (0.62) (-0.20) (-0.04)
Propensity Score 1.99*** 1.99*** 1.37*** 1.36***
(4.76) (4.73) (3.13) (3.10)
Xianjishi 0.05 0.05 0.12 0.12
(0.40) (0.39) (0.82) (0.82)
ln (output initial) -0.40*** -0.40***
(-9.74) (-9.72)
ln (invest. initial) -0.40*** -0.40***
(-9.15) (-9.12)
Constant 1.64*** 1.60*** 1.20*** 1.14*** 5.14*** 5.12*** 5.35*** 5.33***
(7.88) (7.27) (5.33) (4.82) (11.04) (10.96) (9.95) (9.85)
Sample Planned& Planned& Planned& Planned& Planned& Planned& Planned& Planned&
Control Control Control Control Control Control Control Control
Province F.E.s Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 540 540 541 541 540 540 541 541
R2 0.110 0.110 0.054 0.054 0.252 0.252 0.190 0.190
Note: T -values in parentheses: *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
2.5.4 Highway effects or railway effects?
Railways could be another potential disturbance of the highway effects on industry per-
formance, because they are also an important transport infrastructure. The following
facts support our results. First, the number of freight stations in the railway network
6For the unspillovered counties, number of highway neighbors is 0. As a result, we use ln (number of
highway neighbors+1) in the estimation.
7Here, we do not consider the highway situation in a core district of the prefecture because it is
symmetrical. That is, in the geographical sense, if a highway goes through a core district of a prefecture,
it must pass through one or more counties within this prefecture (in most cases). In addition, we calculate
the geographical distance from the toll station to a county to measure the spillover effects more precisely,
because some cross-prefecture counties may be spillovered by highways in other prefectures. However,
since we do not know the exact year a toll station was built, the geographical distance is unable to reflect
highway accessibility for the overall period from 1998 to 2007. For example, if a county is relatively close
to a highway toll station, but did not receive its own toll station until 2005, the highway effects will be
weak, even though the highway is highly accessible. Second, there are cross-prefecture political barriers
within industries, so we believe it is reasonable to assume that substitution effects only occur within a
prefecture.
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did not increase in the past decade. Most were built before 2000, and some even before
1960. The limited number of new railway lines and stations are mostly for passengers,
such as the China Railway High-speed (CRH). Second, coal, coke, petroleum, steel and
iron, metal ores and nonmetal ores, cement, timber, grain, cotton, and salt accounted for
83.2% of the total railway freight ton-kilometers and 91.2% of the total railway freight
traffic in 2007. That is, railways mainly carry raw materials, and not industrial prod-
ucts. Hence, we expect that the road network plays a larger role in shipping industrial
products and so affects the location of an industrial firm. Third, an increasing number
of manufacturing firms are located along highways all over China.
2.6 Conclusion
By employing a micro-level data set, we estimated the effects of highways on indus-
trial development in rural China. We found that highway access promotes industrial
development in counties with higher output and greater levels of industrial investment.
However, highways do not help remote rural counties, which are counties located more
than 300 km from a large city. Furthermore, at the county level, highways tend to pro-
mote the development of heavy industry more than light industry. Moreover, highway
access does not improve industrial productivity or per capita GDP. We use various ro-
bustness checks to ensure and improve the precision of our findings. We also provided
potential explanations for the nonsignificant highway effects on industrial productivity
and per capita GDP. In addition, we investigated the source of the estimated highway
effects, and show that they stem from a net spillover from building the infrastructure,
and not because a county is a substitute for its unconnected neighbors. An interest-
ing extension of this research may be to examine highway effects in conjunction with
urbanization.
Chapter 3
Speeding-Up of Railways and
Exports: Evidence from Silk
Road1
3.1 Introduction
Improvement of domestic transport infrastructure is important to international trade,
since domestic freight costs account for a considerable proportion of the total trade cost,
particularly in large countries. In fact, it has been shown that domestic freight costs
accounted for 36.6% of international transport costs in the United States a few decades
ago (Rousslang and To, 1993). Transport burdens are magnified for firms in interior
cities of China seeking to import low- or medium-value inputs from the coast (World
Bank, 2006). These suggest that domestic transport costs can be an important barrier
to trade2. This feature is strengthened in China-Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan) trade. First, China has a lot of landlocked
territory in the western regions, while its production mainly agglomerates in the eastern
regions. As a result, to move goods to Central Asia (west of China) (see in Figure 3.1),
1I would like to thank Kentaro Nakajima and Takashi Kurosaki for their careful reading and stim-
ulating comments on this research. In addition, I would like to thank Dao-Zhi Zeng, Ruixiang Xiong,
Fre´de´ric Robert-Nicoud, David McKenzie, Ben Zissimos, Kishore Gawande, Jason T. Kerwin, Sandra
Poncet, Zhao Chen, Zhigang Li, Ching-mu Chen, and the participants at the GSIS Seminar (Tohoku
University), GRIPS, Nagoya University, ABCDE 2014 (World Bank), the Third RUSE Workshop (Fu-
dan University), the JEA Spring Meeting (Doshisha University), the European meeting of UEA (St.
Petersburg) and ARSC meeting (Naha) for the beneficial discussions. I am grateful for financial support
from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (DC2: 26-4705). All errors and shortcomings are
my own.
2Except trade, Emran and Hou (2013) find the impact of domestic market access is significantly
large on per capita consumption of households in rural China, and the probability that rural households
participate in non-farm activities.
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Figure 3.1: The geographic proximity of China and Central Asia
Note: Alashankou and kashi are the two main frontier ports for China-Central Asia trade
it is necessary to use long-distance, domestic land transport by either train or truck3.
To reach these five countries, goods must go through the ancient Silk Road4, that is,
first reach Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, and then exit China through frontier ports.
To go through the Silk Road, the transportation will pass through a large, unpopulated
area (desert), because of which, this route is unique (for both rail and road).
For example, for goods shipped from Jiangsu (a province of Eastern China) and exported
to Central Asia, the domestic transportation distance is more than 4,000 km (Jiangsu-
Urumqi is 3,600 km and Urumqi-Alashankou (one of the main frontier ports to Central
Asia) is 477 km). As a result, due to the long domestic distance, many goods are
not profitable to export from Eastern China to Central Asia. Domestic transportation
proves to be too expensive and time-consuming, although eastern regions in China have
a much higher productivity when compared with that of western regions because of a
huge market, rich labor supply, and agglomeration.
This situation was, to some extent, relieved in 2000. Along with the progress of China’s
railway speed-up project (1997-2007), in the third round of this national railway speed-
up project on Oct. 21, 2000, the Longhai (Lianyungang-Lanzhou) and the Lanxin lines
(Lanzhou-Urumqi) were sped-up simultaneously within a day. Travel time between
Xinjiang and Eastern China was significantly lowered, and train capacity was greatly
increased due to higher shift frequency. In addition, the freight cargo to the western
regions was given priority in cargo loading, because of the policy-oriented China’s Go
3There is no river for shipment, and airfreight exports are rare.
4Trade on the Silk Road was a significant factor in the development of the civilizations of China,
the Indian subcontinent, Persia, Europe, and Arabia. It opened long-distance political and economic
interactions between the civilizations (Bentley, 1993). The Chinese portion of the Silk Road is a long
distance land route, from Xi’an to Alashankou, a straight valley that penetrates the Dzungarian Alatau
mountain range, along the border between Kazakhstan and Xinjiang.
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West Campaign (People’s Daily, 2000). This means the efficiency of long-haul domestic
transportation in China-Central Asia trade was greatly improved5.
Thus, this research evaluates the impact of the railway speed-up on exports from China
to Central Asia. I set this speed-up project as a quasi-experiment to identify the role
of domestic market accessibility in firms’ export performance. The railway speed-up
project (1997-2007), as a long-term national development strategy mainly for promoting
regional integration in the country, is not subject to the performance of China-Central
Asia trade, since the related trade volume is small compared to China’s overall national
trade. This clears out the endogeneity concern of the speed-up being related to China-
Central Asia exports. Depending on the different freight modes, speed-up improves the
domestic accessibility to railway freight exports (the treatment group) while for others
(the control group), such as roads, air, etc., it remains the same. By contrasting exports
in both groups before and after the speed-up, and controlling for potential confounding
factors, I can consistently estimate the impact of the railway speed-up project on firms’
exports. Precisely, I perform difference-in-differences estimations on firm transaction-
level data that contains information about the exact geographical origin of the exports,
and the freight modes through which the products exit China.
There is a concern that the railway speed-up effects to exports are heterogeneous based
on points of origin. Exporters enjoying more with sped-up mileage benefit more on
cost and time saving. By restricting the railway freight export samples, I test the
relation between sped-up mileage variation and export performance. That is, I set
exports through rail and gain long-distance speed-up as the treatment group and exports
through rail but with limited sped-up mileage as the control group. Then, I carefully
address the robustness concern by excluding specific samples (with respect to demand
fluctuation of specific products and macroeconomic shocks, like the “Sept. 11 Attacks”)
and conducting counter-factual analysis with data from other years.
I find that railway speed-up increases annual export values to Central-Asia by around
30% at firm-product-destination country level, compared with exports through other
freight modes, and compared with rail freight exports, but enjoy limited speed-up ben-
efits. A positive impact on exporters’ shipment frequency is also significant but much
smaller, suggesting that the speed-up helps exports by expanding the scale of export per
shipment. Consistently, results show that the intensive margin effect, but not extensive
margin, plays a major role in explaining the impact of the speed-up on exports.
Export creation effects from improving transport efficiency are the dominant source of
the speed-up effect. In addition, I find two kinds of diversion effects are mixed into the
5Throughout this chapter, speed-up refers to the speed-up project (containing increased speed, ex-
panded capacity, and upgraded operation modes, etc.), not only to the increase in speed.
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export creation effect. To some extent, some exports once freighted by trucks tend to be
transferred to trains because of improving efficiency in railways. And, Xinjiang exporters
(Xinjiang is the gateway from China to Central Asia, being close to Central Asia. It
enjoys limited speed-up in Oct. 2000) lose some of the Central Asian market to exporters
in other regions (far from Central Asia; competitive in manufacturing productivity),
which obtain better domestic accessibility to Central Asia by the speed-up. This is in
line with the core-peripheral effects of trade integration founded in increasing returns
to scale trade theory and economic geography (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Fujita et
al., 1999). That is, higher efficient transportation (e.g., railway speed-up, expressway
construction) could be associated to a domestic process of integration in manufacturing
location (e.g., Faber, 2014), also, the location of exporters. Customs data also shows
exports of medium-value products are the most sensitive to speed-up. For low-value
products, exports are not affected by the speed-up because they are suitable for leisurely
shipping, not elastic to change in transportation efficiency.
Additionally, I test the export performance with respect to speed-up in another direction,
exports from Xinjiang exporters to other markets, like Japan and US. In this case,
products must experience long-haul freight from Xinjiang to the eastern coastal lines.
If products are moved by rail, then they use almost the full length of both the Lanxin
and the Longhai lines. By checking the export performance of Xinjiang in different
markets, I find the locational advantage of Xinjiang becomes weaker in China-Central
Asia export because of the railway speed-up, while Xinjiang gains better accessibility
to other international markets. The role of speed-up in the regional development of
Xinjiang is two-fold.
My analysis might contribute to two different bodies of literature. First, I provide
evidence on the role of domestic accessibility in international trade participation, and
investigate the channels of domestic transportation improvement effects on export from
different angles, for which both the empirical and theoretical literature are far from
adequate (see e.g., Ago et al., 2006; Albarra´n et al., 2013; Martincus and Blyde, 2013;
Faber, 2014). The most difficult aspect of empirics is that, to identify such effects
requires the successful addressing of potential endogeneity problems affecting the rela-
tionship between domestic transport costs, as determined by infrastructure, and trade.
In this research, I first combine micro firm transaction-level export data and exploit
the railway speed-up project as an exogenous source of variation in transport efficiency.
Second, I provide evidence on the externalities of large-scale transport infrastructure to
specific regions. Xinjiang, as the gateway from China to Central Asia, suffers the loss
of locational advantage because of improving domestic accessibility (similar theoretical
results were suggested in Mori (2012)), and on the other hand, improved domestic acces-
sibility to the coast promotes its export to countries like the US and Japan. There are
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two-sided externalities to the investment in transport infrastructure on the development
of specific regions.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 contains the background
of the China railway speed-up project. In Sections 3.3 and 3.4, I present the empirical
strategy and results, respectively. Section 3.5 discusses the channels and heterogeneity
of railway speed-up effects on export, and Section 3.6 is a simplified evaluation of overall
export impacts on Xinjiang. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 The China railway speed-up project
The China railway speed-up project refers to initiatives undertaken by the Ministry of
Railways, from 1997 to 2007, to increase the speed and capacity of train travel in China
by improving the nation’s railways. The project was implemented in six rounds, and
increased the average speed of passenger trains in China from 48.1 km/h to 70.2 km/h
(there is no official statement regarding the degree of improvements in the average speed
of freight trains). Although the railway speed-up does not directly decrease monetary
transport costs, it decreases the time costs through higher speed and more frequent
shifts. In addition, the speed-up project improves China’s railway system by adopting
new and advanced trains and modified operation modes.
The overall project was undertaken in six sub-rounds and only selected railway lines were
sped-up. The treated railway lines are sped-up at specific dates. Detailed information of
these six rounds is shown in Table 3.1. In the first two rounds, treated lines were the three
capital lines from Beijing to Southern, Eastern, and Northeastern China, respectively.
Then in 2000, in the third round, three major west-east lines were sped-up. Two of them
are the concern of this research, connecting Xinjiang and Eastern China (the Lanxin and
the Longhai lines). Another west-east line is the Zhegan line, which is much shorter than
the Lanxin and the Longhai lines, and not directly related to Xinjiang. In addition, the
Jingjiu line (Beijing-Kowloon), a capital line from Beijing to Southern China was sped-
up in 2000. Then in 2001, 2004, and 2007, many other lines were sped-up successively,
and some lines were sped-up once more.
Table 3.1: Schedule of the railway speed-up project
Date Sped-up Lines
Apr. 1, 1997 Jingguang, Jinghu, Jingha
Oct. 1, 1998 Jingguang, Jinghu, Jingha
Oct. 21, 2000 Longhai, Lanxin, Zhegan, Jingjiu
Oct. 21, 2001 Jingguang, Jingjiu, Zhegan, Huhang, Hada
Apr. 18, 2004 Jinghu, Jingha
Apr. 18, 2007 Jingha, Jingguang, Jinghu, Jingjiu, Longhai, Lanxin, Zhegan
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The achievement of the speed-up project (1997-2007) is significant, as shown in Table
3.2. In this decade, the highest rail speed increased from less than 140 km/h to 250
km/h, and more passengers can reach their destinations (if less than 1,500 km) within
one night. For three kinds of freight trains (five-set freight trains6, bulk cargo trains,
and parcel trains), shift frequency was largely increased. For the speed-up in Oct. 2000,
a considerable number of new five-set freight trains, as well as bulk cargo trains, were
applied on sped-up lines, suggesting capacity was expansed. There is no exact speed
data on freight trains, for the passenger trains, around 20% of the travel time was saved
for trips from Urumqi to Lanzhou (from 33 to 27 hours), Beijing (from 63 to 50 hours),
and Shanghai (from 66 to 51 hours) (Sources: China’s Train Time Table (Lieche Shike
Biao), 2000, 2001). For both capacity and speed, it is obvious that they were greatly
improved because of the speed-up project.
Table 3.2: Achievements of the railway speed-up project
Panel A: Overall achievements of the speed-up project (1997-2007)
Before 1997 1997 1998 2000 2001 2004 2007
Highest speed (km/hr) n.a. 140 160 n.a. n.a. 200 250
Five-set freight trains (no. of lines) 0 40 40 71 79 92 121
Bulk cargo trains (no. of lines) n.a. n.a. 119 138 157 180 406
Parcel trains (no. of paired lines) 0 0 8 14 15 19 n.a.
Average speed of passenger trains (km/hr) 48.1 54.9 55.2 60.3 61.6 65.7 70.2
Passenger lines starting at daybreak n.a. 78 228 266 n.a. 305 337
and arriving at sunset (no. of lines)
Panel B: Travel time changes between major cities due to the speed-up on Oct. 21, 2000
pre-speed-up post-speed-up time saved
Urumqi-Lanzhou (1,892 km) 33 hrs 27 hrs 18 pct
Urumqi-Beijing (3,216 km) 63 hrs 50 hrs 21 pct
Urumqi-Shanghai (4,077 km) 66 hrs 51 hrs 23 pct
Sources: Various, collated by author.
As shown in Figure 3.2, the Longhai (Lianyungang-Lanzhou) and the Lanxin (Lanzhou-
Urumqi) lines are the main routes from Eastern China to Xinjiang, as well as Central
Asia. Total mileage of these two lines is 3,651 km, accounting for a large part of the
overall China-Central Asia transportation network. Compared to the high density of
China’s railway network, most of the railways, except the Longhai and the Lanxin lines,
were not to be sped-up in this round.
6Five-set freight trains: freight trains with scheduled stations, train numbers, routes, times, and
prices, with simplified freight procedures, reasonable prices, and guaranteed time, capacity, and cargo
security. It is a new freight service of the China Railway Group, available since 1997 in response to the
decreasing market share. The China Railway Group operates China’s railway freight under bureaucracy
and complete monopoly, its passive market-oriented reform is argued to be a main reason for its low
freight efficiency and decreasing freight market share. Compared to truck transportation, capacity
availability and arrival times are not well set in the railway freight system. Train shippers do not know
the exact train and date the goods are loaded, and the exact date of arrival, when they order a freight
service. Cargo capacity for a specific train, at a specific station and specific date is not set, and dependent
on the usage rate of cargo capacity at previous stations, cargo demands at current station, etc., that is,
in freight season, the travel time and capacity cannot be guaranteed. As a result, trucks have become
the premium mode for land freight in China.
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Figure 3.2: China’s railway network in 2009
Note: The Lanxin (Lanzhou-Urumqi) and the Longhai (Lianyungang-Lanzhou) lines, marked in bold
lines, are sped-up on Oct. 2000.
3.3 Empirical strategy
Prior to empirical strategy, I provide direct evidences at the country level that the speed-
up in specific railway lines indeed affected the related railway traffic, which suggests
that the empirical studies in this research are advisable. Then, I address the exogeneity
concern of the railway speed-up project to China-Central Asia export, and introduce data
and quasi-experimental settings for the main estimations. Precisely, baseline estimations
consist of two kinds of quasi-experimental approaches.
3.3.1 Speed-up effects on national railway traffic
To clearly tell the story that the railway speed-up projects affected exports, it is nec-
essary to provide more direct quantitative evidence that the national railway speed-up
project indeed affected the regional transportation in China. To do so, I conduct a
panel data estimation proving this argument. Among all the national railway speed-
up projects in 1997-2007, some railway lines got sped-up at least once, while others
never got sped-up. Hence, I construct a panel data on the turnover/traffic growth of
freight/passenger for China’s main railway lines, and test whether or not the railway
lines that were sped-up have a higher growth rate (in freight turnover, freight traffic,
passenger turnover, and passenger traffic) in the corresponding year (if the speed-up
occurred before April: 1997, 2004, 2007, I set that year as treated; if the speed-up oc-
curred in October: 1998, 2000, 2001, I set the following year as treated). The sample is
26 railway lines in 10 years. If railway line i gets speed-up treatments in the year t, then
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I set Treatedi,t=1. I test the speed-up effects with Equation 3.1. Growth represents
the annual growth rates for the four indicators, and Treated is the binary variable, as
mentioned above. η and µ are line and year fixed effects.
Growthi,t = α0 + α1Treatedi,t + ηi + µt + i,t. (3.1)
Table 3.3: Railway turnover and traffic, with respect to the speed-up project
Annual growth rate of
freight turnover freight traffic passenger turnover passenger traffic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treated 0.0660** 0.1080* 0.1135* -0.0149
(0.0316) (0.0577) (0.0599) (0.0808)
With two-way fixed effects
Observations 235 236 189 186
R-squared 0.0139 0.0233 0.0128 0.0001
Notes: Treated is a binary variable, but not a typical dummy variable. It is set as 1 for the lines in
the year of the sped-up. Some lines are exclusively devoted to transport of cargo, so the sample size for
passenger turnover/traffic is relatively small. For column 1, the average annual growth rate for the full
sample is 6.5%, suggesting growth rate doubled for treated lines in the sped-up year, reaching 13.1%.
For freight traffic (column 2), average annual growth rate is 5.6%, and that for sped-up lines reaches
16.4%, on average.
Source: China Railway Yearbook 1999-2008.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Results in Table 3.3 are suggestive. Considering freight turnover and traffic growth,
both of them present significant promotion effects in the treated samples and years,
achieving 6.6% and 10.8% higher than average annual growth rate, respectively, which
are rather considerable. For column 1, the average annual growth rate of the full sample
is 6.5%, suggesting the growth rate doubled for treated lines in sped-up years, reaching
13.1%. For freight traffic, average annual growth rate is 5.6%, and sped-up lines reached
16.4% on average. Passenger turnover was also promoted, although it is not related to
export issues here. Passenger traffic was not affected significantly. Quantitatively, the
railway speed-up effects on railway transportation are presented, which suggest that the
following tests are reasonable.
3.3.2 Exogeneity concern
Prior to the quasi-experimental setting, I emphasize the exogenous concern of the speed-
up projects on China-Central Asia exports. The speed-up in 2000 was the third round
of the entire speed-up project, with six total rounds. The entire project was mainly
considered as a national long-term development strategy to promote regional integration,
population (goods) transportation between inland and coastal regions, and guaranteeing
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national defense. It is reasonable to assume that the China-Central Asia trade was not
a determinant of the speed-up project. Actually, trade with Central Asia is limited,
compared with China’s total international trade. In 2000, China’s total exports were
249.71 billion USD, while the export to Central Asia was 0.77 billion USD, accounting
for only 0.31% of the national export (Source: China External Economics Statistical
Yearbook 2001).
Then, speed-up promotes the railways, but not other freight modes like roads, shipping,
and air. In 2000, the Lianhuo expressway (Eastern China-Xinjiang) had not yet been
constructed. In addition, in this speed-up round, few railway lines were sped-up, except
these two lines, which guaranteed that other railway routes were unchanged. More-
over, unlike the construction of roads, this railway speed-up was finished simultaneously
within one day and not gradually, so the impact was more direct and observable. The
public noticed the third round speed-up before Oct. 21, 2000; as a result, it induced an
expectation, causing it not an absolute exogenous shock, like a natural disaster. Export,
to some extent, is time-sensitive and subject to contract obligations, that is, exporters
cannot put off the shipping to meet the speed-up project. So one can suppose that the
overall bilateral trade (annual level) will not be much affected by the expectation of
the speed-up project. Further, exporters participate in Central Asia market might not
export only to Central Asia, in most of the cases, they will export also to other inter-
national markets. In this case the benefit of firm re-location to obtain access of sped-up
railways is not that large, since the speed-up in 2000 only benefits four railway lines, for
the freight to other regions, except Xinjiang, the freight efficiency is not necessary to
be improved. Thus we suppose the endogenous problem of exports response to railway
speed-up (through firm re-location) is minor.
In addition, unlike most international trade, China-Central Asia trade is more dependent
on rail and road freight, since there is no river and sea for shipping, and the domestic
transportation distance is rather long, representing the transportation efficiency (time
and monetary costs, and business risks) is considerable in total trade cost.
Also, the macro economic environment in Central Asia will affect the demand of Chinese
products in Central Asia market, which potentially affects the effectiveness of my quasi-
experiment estimation. Table B.1 and B.2 give the descriptive summary of Central Asia
economy, as well as the rail transport infrastructure improvements in Central Asia. First,
Table B.1 suggests the the macro social economy of Central Asia is stable in the periods
of railway speed-up (Oct., 2000) in China. In the periods of 1996-2005, GDP per capita
in all of these fives countries grows rapidly. Population size of Kazakhstan decreases
by 3% (0.5 million) in this period, while the rest four countries have stable increase.
Imports of Kazakhstan, as the largest economy in Central Asia, increase greatly by 78%
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in this decade. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan get doubled in their import scale, although
their economic sizes are much smaller than Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. However, in
the much shorter period, 2000-2001, one year before and one year after the speed-up
(Oct., 2000) in China, import value in all these five countries are stable. I also present
the export value, and share of manufactures imports in total merchandise imports, both
are stable in the study period, particularly in 2000-2001. The stable external economic
environment ensures trade fluctuation from demand shock might be avoided. Second,
Table B.2 gives the descriptive statistics in transport infrastructure. Obviously, there
is no big push on the transport infrastructure in the period closing to 2000 (rail speed
data in Central Asia is not available.). These natural settings allow a quasi-experiment
approach for comparing the performance of China-Central Asia export between benefited
and other exporters, before and after the project.
3.3.3 Quasi-experimental settings and data
I conduct two kinds of quasi-experimental approaches estimating the railway speed-up
effects on export. The first approach is to compare the difference in export perfor-
mance to Central Asia between 2000 and 2001, and between railway freight products
and products with other freight modes7. I employ the firm transaction-level customs
data from Chinese Longitudinal Firm Trade Transaction Database (CLFTTD), in which
I use the firm transaction-level export data showing the unique firm ID code, address of
the firm, transaction date, export products (eight-digit Harmonized Commodity Coding
System, HS-8), place of manufacture (city level), destination country, freight mode8,
export value, unit value, etc. I extract the records referring to exports to Central-Asia
in 2000-20019, and I employ only short period data (two years), because customs data
is not available before 2000, and long-term export performance tends to be affected by
noise, such as road construction.
7I focus exclusively on the export, but not import from Central Asia to China, because the bilateral
trade between China and Central Asia is dominated by the export from China to Central Asia.
8The database records freight mode of each transaction when exiting China. I assume the domestic
freight mode is equal to that when exiting China. It is reasonable, since the domestic and foreign routes
are connected in Alashankou/Kashi, and since both are forms of land transportation, to switch the
freight mode incurs a switching cost. Moreover, railway and road freight goods are not homogeneous.
Roads are responsible for light industry goods while railways transport heavy industry goods and raw
materials. Hence, it is reasonable to assume the freight mode when exiting China is the same as that
for domestic freight.
9Donation samples (government donations) are excluded. In the transaction records of Central Asia
export, the exporting firm and the manufacturer are the same or belong to the same province in more
than 95% of the observations. For the rest, they are domestically imported from other regions (places
of manufacture) to Xinjiang, and then exported by firms in Xinjiang. I exclude these samples (less than
5%) to ensure credibility in identification.
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Figure 3.3: Ratio of rail/non-rail freight exports from China to Central Asia
Hence, depending on the different freight modes, I assume domestic transport efficiency
improved for rail freight exports that enjoyed the speed-up, while that for others re-
mained the same, thus inducing better export performance for rail freight products. In
2000-2001, within the total shipment records from China to Central Asia, 33% of the
shipments were taken by railways and 57% were taken by roads, with the rest 10% by
air or ocean shipments (indirect shipment that was transferred in Russia), suggesting
railway is an important freight mode in this bilateral trade. Figure 3.3 shows that in the
four quarters of 2000, the ratios of rail/non-rail freight export in export value, number
of shipments, and the number of exporters are stable. However, from the first quarter
of 2001, two months after the speed-up in Oct. 2000, the related ratio of export value
increases, while for another two indicators, they keep a trend similar to that before the
speed-up. Figure 3.4 shows that the export value per shipment and export value per
exporter immediately increase after the speed-up for rail freight exports, compared with
that of non-rail freight exports.
From Figures 3.3 and 3.4, it is shown that the potential speed-up treatment effect occurs
in the first quarter of 2001, that is, 2000 is not affected by the speed-up project. Thus I
use annual data, instead of quarterly data, to relieve the seasonal data noise. I aggregate
the firm transaction-level data into firm-product (HS-8)-country (destination)-freight
mode-year level. In short, I aggregate the transaction data with the same exporter,
products (the same HS-8 code), destination country, freight mode (rail, road, air, and
ocean shipping), and year. Data description is presented in Table B.3. For a part
of aggregated annual data, there is no paired data in the firm-product-country-freight
mode-level. New exporters in 2001 have no positive export value in 2000, and vice-versa,
for exporters exiting this market. For the unpaired data, I set the corresponding value
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Figure 3.4: Ratio of rail/non-rail freight exports from China to Central Asia (2)
in the related year to 0, which induces a larger sample size in econometric estimation
than in data summary. Baseline estimation equation is as follows:
ExportValuef,p,c,t,y = α0 + α1Railf,p,c,y + α2Railf,p,c,y × y2001f,p,c,t + α3y2001f,p,c,r + f,p,c,t,y.
(3.2)
Rail is a dummy variable, identifying the freight mode, where Rail=1 if the export
transaction is undertaken by railway freight and Rail=0 otherwise. y2001 is a dummy
variable for year 2001, with y2001 =1 for the exports recorded in 2001 and 0 for those
in 2000. Subscripts f, p, c, t, and y represent firm, product, country, freight mode, and
year, respectively. To eliminate firm-product-country-freight mode (f-p-c-t) level hetero-
geneity, I use a within estimator. That is, I normalize the export value by subtracting
the mean of annual export value (Ann.Exp.) in 2000-2001. I set
ExportV aluef,p,c,t,y=Ann.Exp.f,p,c,t,y-(Ann.Exp.f,p,c,t,2000+Ann.Exp.f,p,c,t,2001)/2, y=2000,
2001.
By controlling for the f-p-c-t level heterogeneity, year, and rail freight dummies, the
interaction term Rail × y2001 captures the potential railway speed-up effects. If the
related exporting activities are promoted, it should show a positive coefficient.
For the second empirical approach, it is straightforward to suppose that the railway
speed-up effects to exports are heterogeneous with respect to the origin. For exporters
with long-haul domestic freight, time costs and business risks (unexpected delivery delay
or loss) are higher compared to that of short-haul exporters. Speed-up in 2000 saves
time for freight from Eastern China to Central Asia. And, thirty-one five-set freight
trains were applied after speed-up in this round (see in Table 3.2), suggesting a higher
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capacity and higher efficiency in west-east transportation. Further, although freight
rate is not directly decreased by the speed-up, the actual transportation cost might
also decrease. Li and Chen (2013) find the price difference goes to smaller between
connected regions in the case of relieved transportation congestion, even if the freight
rate is unchanged10. These factors suggest that exporters to the Central Asian market,
with long-haul domestic transportation, are supposed to benefit more through the speed-
up. In the estimation of Equation 3.2, I drop this variation by uniformly setting a binary
variable for rail freight exports, which inevitably causes information loss. I hence conduct
an estimation fully using the variation on sped-up mileage.
Freight and passenger transportation in rail are operated separately in most cases. Cod-
ing systems for freight trains are not tractable, thus, I cannot get the exact sped-up
mileage from the route for each freight train. I use data from passenger trains as a
proxy to measure the sped-up mileage. Although the routes for freight and passenger
trains from the same starting and terminal stations are not necessarily the same, it is
reasonable to use as a proxy.
Instead of calculating the exact railway mileage from each firm to frontier ports, for
simplicity, I choose the distance from the capital of the province the firms are located
in, to Urumqi, to represent the total mileage for each firm to Alashankou and Kashi
(all of the exports from China to Central Asia will go through the route from Urumqi
to Alashankou or Kashi, and these routes were not sped-up, so I need not consider
these routes). I calculate the total railway mileage and travel routes (with respect
to the operating rail trips) based on the minimal transportation times (first screening
principle) and minimal total mileage (second screening principle) (data is based on the
official Train Time Table of 2000). Under this calculation strategy, for example, the
total railway mileage from Fuzhou (Capital of the Fujian Province) to Urumqi is 4,555
km, and the trip will be divided into two parts: Fuzhou-Zhengzhou (1,476 km) and
Zhengzhou-Urumqi (3,079 km). In this case, I set the sped-up mileage as 3,079 km,
since the second part was sped-up in Oct. 2000 and the first part was unchanged. Cities
within the Xinjiang Province also enjoy considerable sped-up mileage (up to 500 km)
because Xinjiang has a rather large land area. In the calculation of the sped-up mileage,
however, I set the location of firms at the provincial level for simplicity, that is, cities
within Xinjiang are set as 0 km in sped-up mileage. The details of sped-up mileage are
presented in Table B.411.
10When speaking of inefficient capacity and congestion, long-haul transportation is more likely to
suffer from these than short-haul transportation. For example, in the peak season, long-haul tickets are
always much tighter than short-haul tickets.
11When calculating the sped-up mileage, I consider another two lines sped-up in Oct. 21, 2000:
the Zhegan line and the Jingjiu lines. The sped-up mileage on these two lines is also included in the
calculation of speed-up mileage.
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Estimation strategy for this approach is shown in Equation 3.3. I use only the samples
of rail freight exports to avoid the disturbances from fluctuations in non-rail freight
exports. I set Mileage as the logarithm of sped-up mileage (=ln(Sped-up mileage+1)).
ExportValue and y2001 are the same variables as in Equation 3.2. To fit my assumption,
the estimated coefficient of the interaction term between Mileage and y2001 is supposed
to be significantly positive.
ExportValuef,p,c,y = α0 + α1Mileagef + α2Mileagef × y2001f,p,c + α3y2001f,p,c + f,p,c,y.
(3.3)
3.4 Baseline results and robustness tests
3.4.1 Baseline results
In column 1 of Table 3.4, I present the estimation results for Equation 3.2. The interac-
tion term is found to be significantly positive. The concerned interaction coefficient is
0.0957, which means that on average, the railway speed-up project promotes the related
firm-product-country level rail freight exports by 95.7 thousand USD per year. Since
the mean of annual export value for rail freight products in firm-product-country-level is
137.8 thousand USD in 2000 (see Table B.1), I might infer that the speed-up promotes
a 69% increase in related exports12. This result sounds extremely large but is still rea-
sonable. First, the base for China-Central Asia export is small, thus a large growth rate
is easy to achieve, and export shocks on non-rail freighted products lead to an overes-
timation on this result (will be shown in robustness tests). Further, in columns 2-4, I
present the estimated results with data aggregated in other levels. Column 2 refers to an
estimation with firm-product-freight mode-year level data, that is, I do not distinguish
the destination countries of Central Asia. Columns 3 and 4 refer to estimations with
firm-country-freight mode-year level data and product-country-freight mode-year level
data. Results are all significant, and suggest positive export promotion effects from the
railway speed-up project.
12In estimations, I use the absolute value of export as the dependent variable instead of the logarithm
of the export value because there are many unpaired data. For the unpaired data, export value in a
year without positive export records is naturally set as 0 after taking logarithms (assume the export
value is 1 USD), the export performance change will thus be noise in the statistical estimation. For
example, when comparing the performance between two exporters: exporter A (export value is 0 USD
in 2000, and 1,000 USD in 2001) and exporter B (export value is 10,000 USD in 2000, and 100,000 USD
in 2001), the actual export growth is obviously larger for exporter B. However, the growth is eliminated
by taking logarithms: For exporter A, the growth is ln1000-ln1=6.9, and for exporter B, it is ln100000-
ln10000=2.3. When I restrict samples to the records containing positive pair data, the baseline result
remains consistent. The estimated interaction coefficient is 0.4208 at a 10% significance level, suggesting
the speed-up increased related export value by 52.3% (Results are available upon request).
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Furthermore, I present the estimation of Equation 3.2 with data of other years as a
placebo test in columns 5-8 of Table 3.4. I set the placebo test with data of 2001-2002
(2001 is set as the “control” year and 2002 is set as the “treated” year), both of these
two years being after the speed-up in 200013. If the baseline results on the speed-up
effects are unbiased and exclusively originated from the railway speed-up project, the
placebo test result is supposed to be insignificant14. As shown in columns 5-8, I find
that the results are not consistent with baseline estimations, neither of the interaction
terms between Rail and y2002 is significant and all the coefficients have much smaller
absolute values than the baseline estimations. This implies that the estimated speed-up
effect is not systematically biased.
Table 3.4: Baseline and placebo regressions
Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2000-2001 2001-2002
Rail×y2001 0.0957*** 0.1027*** 0.6326*** 0.1950***
(0.0176) (0.0202) (0.2348) (0.0383)
Rail×y2002 0.0075 0.0070 -0.0980 -0.0158
(0.0161) (0.0160) (0.1323) (0.0286)
Sample type f-p-c f-p f-c p-c f-p-c f-p f-c p-c
Observations 12916 12058 2216 6990 15390 15098 2836 7996
R-squared 0.0038 0.0036 0.0049 0.0057 0.0032 0.0034 0.0075 0.0069
Notes: Coefficients of single and constant terms are not reported. This applies for all the following
estimations.
f-p-c: firm-product-country-freight mode-year level data;
f-p: firm-product-freight mode-year level data;
f-c: firm-country-freight mode-year level data;
p-c: product-country-freight mode-year level data, these apply for all specified tables.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Then, I further consider the within rail freight exports variation of the speed-up project.
Before conducting an estimation of Equation 3.3, in Figure 3.5, I present the kernel
density of the export transaction distribution, with respect to sped-up mileage for the rail
freight exports in 2000 and 2001. Descriptively, for the post speed-up year, 2001 (dashed
line), a higher share of the transactions to Central Asia is taken by exporters located
in regions more than 3,000 km away from Urumqi, and the share of transactions by
exporters located within Xinjiang decreased compared with that in 2000. This suggests
13To ensure the pre-treatment parallel trend in rail freight and non-rail freight exports, the preferred
placebo test is to compare export performance difference between 1999 and 2000. Unfortunately, customs
data in 1999 is not available. In Oct. 2001, there was another railway speed-up (fourth round of the
national railway speed-up project), however, this round focused on other railway lines, and does not
affect China-Central Asia trade.
14Based on customs data, it is impossible to clearly identify whether or not manufacturing exporters
(road freight exports) in western China benefited from the railway speed-up by any alternative, such as
a decrease in the transportation cost of imported raw materials and intermediates (rail freight imports)
from coastal regions or other countries. The placebo test, using data of 2001-2002, systematically relieves
this concern.
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Figure 3.5: Kernel density of export transaction distribution with respect to sped-up
mileage
Note: Cities within Xinjiang also enjoys considerably sped-up mileage (up to 500 km) because Xinjiang
is of a rather large size. In the calculation of the sped-up mileage, I set the location of firms to the
provincial level for simplicity. As a consequence, all exports originating from Xinjiang, no matter whether
from Urumqi (capital of Xinjiang), or other cities, are seen as identical, with sped-up mileage being 0
km. Figures are based on the data of railway freight exports to Central Asia in 2000 and 2001.
that Central Asia exports are more likely to be made by coastal exporters instead of
exporters in Xinjiang, because of the improving domestic transport efficiency. Figure 3.6
shows that before-and-after the speed-up, the ratio of export (Xinjiang/other regions)
noticeably decreases.
Table 3.5: Effects of the speed-up on mileage
Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2000-2001 2001-2002
Mileage×y2001 0.0053* 0.0057* 0.0202
(0.0028) (0.0030) (0.0158)
Mileage×y2002 -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0355
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0308)
Sample type f-p-c f-p f-c f-p-c f-p f-c
Observations 5102 4788 1120 6428 6344 1508
R-squared 0.0013 0.0014 0.0039 0.0022 0.0024 0.0053
Notes: Same as Table 3.4.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Column 1 of Table 3.5 tells the related econometric results of equation (3). By restrict-
ing the samples in rail freight exports consistently, the interaction term is significantly
positive, which suggests the west-east railway speed-up helps the long-distance exporters
more. Average sped-up mileage in 2001 in firm-product-country-freight mode level is
1,772 km, and when compared to the case without speed-up, the promotion effect is
0.040 million USD (=0.0053×ln1773) (I set the Mileage as ln(Sped-up mileage+1) to
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Figure 3.6: Ratio of railway freight exports from China (Xinjiang/other regions) to
Central Asia
avoid a zero value for the logarithm). Mean of rail freight exports in firm-product-
country level in 2000, with positive sped-up mileage, is 0.142 million USD, suggesting
the average promotion to exports by the speed-up to be 28%. This is much smaller than
the estimate in Equation 3.2.
I also test using other aggregated level data and the results are presented in columns
2 and 3. At a firm-country level, results are insignificant. Since I need information on
location to obtain the sped-up mileage, I do not conduct the estimation with product-
country level data, as in Table 3.4. Then, same as the baseline estimations, the counter-
factual analysis in columns 4-6 of Table 3.5 do not overthrow the baseline conclusions.
In 2001-2002, there is no positive difference-in-difference result, since there is no railway
speed-up project in this period benefiting locations on the Silk Road.
As discussed in Section 3.3, only the export value of rail freight exports increases due
to the speed-up in 2001, but shipment frequency does not increase proportionally. This
is a natural result, for when facing a demand increase, exporters will choose to increase
export value per shipment but not increase shipment frequency to save on freight costs
(each shipment has a fixed cost, and the unit cost in freight has an increasing return
feature). This is shown in Panel B of Table B.1, as rail freight exports increase the
value per shipment compared to that of non-rail freight exports in 2001. I use the
number of shipments to Central-Asia as the dependent variable, testing Equations 3.2
and 3.3. In Table 3.6, I present the results with 2000-2001 data in the first two columns,
and then put the placebo test in columns 3 and 4. Column 1 shows that the railway
speed-up promotes the benefited exporters by 0.22 times per year, in terms of number
of shipments. Noting that the related average number of shipments in 2000 is 2.55
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times, of which 0.22 (9%) is a considerable, however, much smaller growth rate than
that of export value. This suggests that the promotion effect plays a role by increasing
the export value per shipment but not through shipment frequency. Columns 2-4 refer
to estimations of Equation 3.3 and placebo tests, where results are consistent with my
assumptions, although in column 4, the related coefficient is negative.
Table 3.6: Effects of the speed-up on the number of shipments
Number of Shipments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2000-2001 2001-2002
Rail×y2001 0.2213***
(0.0482)
Rail×y2002 -0.0595
(0.0370)
Mileage×y2001 0.1076***
(0.0076)
Mileage×y2002 -0.0379***
(0.0063)
Samples all rail all rail
Observations 12916 5102 15390 6428
R-squared 0.0183 0.0478 0.0654 0.0868
Notes: Estimation results are based on firm-product-country-freight mode-year level data. This applies
for the following tables without specification.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
3.4.2 Robustness tests
Robustness tests are mainly concerned with the demand shock of specific product ex-
ports and macroeconomic shocks. It is obvious from Table B.1 that in 2001, non-rail
freight exports experience a sharp decrease, although it might be partially caused by
the diversion effect of the freight mode, that is, from non-rail freight to rail freight be-
cause of the improvement in efficiency in rail freight from the railway speed-up. It is
necessary to take into account the potential disturbance from export demand shocks.
The main products exported to Central Asia through railways are machines, chemical
raw materials, and building materials, while through non-rail modes are clothes, shoes,
textiles, and household appliances. Products of heavy industries are mainly freighted
through rail and light industries through non-rail modes, mainly roads (see the details
of the exporting categories at the bottom of Table 3.7).
Since the main products are heterogeneous between rail and non-rail freight, it raises a
potential disturbance to my baseline identification. Rise or fall of short-term demand
for specific products that are freighted exclusively by rail or non-rail modes will affect
the baseline results. For example, even if the export of rail freight products are actually
not affected by the speed-up project, the baseline estimation will still be positively
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significant, as presented in the baseline result, if there is an unexpected fall in the export
of clothes, shoes, textiles, household appliances, etc. (dominated by non-rail freight) in
2001, compared with that of 2000. In addition, if there were a rise in the demand of
heavy products like machines, chemical raw materials, and building materials, it would
also induce the same results.
To check this concern, firstly, in column 2 of Table 3.7, I exclude five product categories
that have the highest export values in rail freight exports (Top 5 in rail) from the
full sample, and estimate Equation 3.2. Interaction term coefficient becomes slightly
smaller, to 0.0804, and remains significant at a 1% level. When I only include these five
categories, the result is positively significant. Then in column 4, I exclude five categories
which have the highest export values in non-rail freight exports (Top 5 in non-rail)
from the full sample, the concerned coefficient becomes much smaller, although it is still
significant at a 1% level. It could be explained by a fall in the demand for exports of non-
rail dominated exports, which caused the overestimation of baseline results in column
1. After excluding the specific non-rail exports, the coefficient decreases to 0.0377,
signifying a 37.7 thousand USD increase in related annual export value (increased by
27%)15. Similarly, in columns 5-8, I present the placebo tests with data from 2001-2002,
in which neither of the concerned interaction terms is significant, suggesting that the
baseline estimation results are not biased by specific product exports.
Secondly, on macroeconomic shocks, 2001 is a special year in international trade, for both
China and the World. In Dec. 2001, China joined the WTO as its 143rd member, which
promoted China’s international trade significantly in the following years. However, this
variation does not affect my estimations, since I set the treated and control samples
within the year 2000-2001, namely, these two years’ export performance is actually not
affected by the WTO agreement, issued by the end of 2001. Then, another economic
shock is the “Sept. 11 Terrorist Attack,” as a consequence of which world trade shows
an unexpected negative growth. Since the 1980s, the only year with negative growth in
world trade is 2001. World trade value increases by 13% in 2000, but drops by 4% in
2001 because of the global economic and political instability. Then in 2002, it recovers
by increasing 4% (Source: International Trade Statistics, WTO). Overall, Xinjiang is
sensitive to terrorism because of its geographic location as a border area, and historical
15In the case of excluding top 10 product categories in non-rail freight exports, this figure further
decreases to 23% and is still statistically significant at a 1% level. Actually, the top 5 product categories
in non-rail freight exports account for 67% of the total exports with non-rail freight. For the top 10, the
share reaches 82%, therefore, excluding the top 10 non-rail freight exports almost removes all the control
samples. Hence, exclusion of the top 5 product categories is supposed to exclude the disturbance from
non-rail export demand shocks. In addition, if the decrease in exports under non-rail freight is not caused
by intra-industry demand shocks but by overall economic fluctuations, the estimated promotion effect
is underestimated if excluding these products exports. Thus, I can suppose that the actual treatment
effect should be around 30%. For the number of shipments, the related result decreases to around 13%
when excluding top 5 product categories in non-rail.
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Table 3.7: Demand fluctuations from specific products
Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
2000-2001 2001-2002
Full ex Top 5 only Top 5 ex Top 5 Full ex Top 5 only Top 5 ex Top 5
rail rail non-rail rail rail non-rail
Rail×y2001 0.0957*** 0.0804*** 0.0690** 0.0377***
(0.0176) (0.0210) (0.0341) (0.0121)
Rail×y2002 0.0075 -0.0001 (0.0143) 0.0163
(0.0161) (0.0143) (0.0445) (0.0167)
Observations 12916 9822 3094 9656 15390 11050 4340 12142
R-squared 0.0036 0.0062 0.0046 0.0007 0.0030 0.0080 0.0001 0.0014
Notes: Same as Tables 3.4 and 3.6.
Customs database records the eight-digit customs classification code (HS-8) for each transaction. For
simplicity, I cut the first two digits of the HS-8 (HS-2), and classify the cargo of China-Central Asia export
into 89 categories. The details can be checked at: http://www.allmyinfo.com/eng/services/index1-3.asp.
Top 5 in rail: 84,27,28,85, and 73 (ranked); Top 5 in non-rail: 64,62,61,58, and 85 (ranked). Products
that the HS-2 refers to:
27: Coal, Asphalt, Lubricating oils, Vaseline, etc.;
28: Chemical products (Iodine, Calcium, Phosphorus, etc.);
58: Various textiles;
61, 62: Suits, Coats, Skirts, Sportswear, Shirts, Trousers, Underwear, etc.;
64: Shoes, Accessories of shoes;
73: Pipes, Screws, Steel building materials, etc.;
84: Engines, Air conditioning, Refrigerators, Machine tools, etc.;
85: Telephones, Digital cameras, Televisions, Lamps, Microwaves, Cookers, etc.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
ethnic conflict, so the “Sept. 11 Attacks” greatly affect the China-Central Asia export.
The ratio of export value to Central Asia (Sept.-Dec./annual) from 2000-2003, fell in
2001 due to the “Sept. 11 Attacks,” dropping from higher than 0.4 (in 2000, 2002, and
2003) to less than 0.3 (Sources: China’s customs database, 2000-2003). In the period
of Sept.-Dec. 2001, it is obvious that China-Central Asia export experienced abnormal
decline, as did world trade, because of the terrorist attacks. I test the stability of my
baseline results concerning this macroeconomic and political fluctuation. I exclude the
exports in Sept.-Dec. in both years, since exports are seasonally heterogeneous. Then I
estimate the placebo test with the data excluding the Sept.-Dec. period.
In column 1 of Table 3.8, the interaction term between Rail and y2001 remains sig-
nificant and valued at 0.0769, slightly smaller than that of the baseline estimation of
0.0957. Similarly, in column 2, I keep the rail freight export samples only, and insert
the sped-up mileage into estimation, with the result remaining unchanged. Columns 3
and 4 give a placebo test with consistent results.
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Table 3.8: Effect of the “Sept. 11 Attacks”
Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Jan.-Aug., 2000-2001 Jan.-Aug., 2001-2002
Rail×y2001 0.0769***
(0.0155)
Rail×y2002 0.0029
(0.0135)
Mileage×y2001 0.0069**
(0.0033)
Mileage×y2002 -0.0000
(0.0025)
Samples all rail all rail
Observations 9264 3660 10622 4520
R-squared 0.0031 0.0015 0.0007 0.0000
Notes: Same as Tables 3.4 and 3.6.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
3.5 Mechanisms
In this section, I investigate the channels of the speed-up effect on China-Central Asia
export. Precisely, I try to distinguish between the diversion and creation effects. I am
concerned about the diversion of Central Asia exports between different freight modes:
rail, road, etc., and between different locations: Xinjiang and other regions of China.
In addition, I check time- and capacity-related causes to export performance stemming
from the speed-up, as well as intensive and extensive margin effects. Then, I test the
heterogeneity on export promotion, with respect to unit price and firm size.
3.5.1 Channels of the speed-up effects on exports
Speed-up effect on exports is observed in the results of baseline estimations. Except the
export creation effect, diversion effects also might contribute to the baseline estimations
if exports once taken by trucks, are switched to trains because of increased speed and
capacity of railways. In this case, the two effects are mixed. I divide exports by freight
mode to distinguish export diversion and creation effects. If a product (HS-8 level) is
freighted by both trains and trucks within the same firm-product-country level export, I
set it as having multiple modes of freight. Otherwise, it is identified with a single freight
mode. For the first case, it is supposed to show a diversion effect from non-rail to rail
responding to railway speed-up.
Results of columns 1 and 2 of Table 3.9 suggest that for multiple freight mode products,
the coefficient of the interaction term is much higher than baseline estimations and
that of single freight mode products. Based on the estimated coefficients and mean
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value in related aggregated level, the export promotion effect of the railway speed-
up in multiple freight mode products is 167%, and for the rest, it is 64%. When I
test using the number of shipments instead of export value, the difference persists,
the extent being 42% (multiple) to 12% (single) (results are available upon request).
Obviously, multiple freight mode products enjoy a greater promotion effect because of
a latent diversion effect from non-rail freight modes to rail. However, multiple freight
mode samples account for only 18% of rail freight exports to Central Asia in 2000-2001,
suggesting the diversion effect from non-rail to rail freight mode cannot fully explain
the effects of the railway speed-up on export. Results of column 2 suggest that the
export creation effect dominates the speed-up effect, from the evidence of the other 82%
of rail freight exports (use single freight mode). Then in columns 3 and 4, I identify
the exports with a multiple and single freight mode, at product (p) level instead of the
firm-product-country (f-p-c) level. The estimated diversion effects become weak, with
both the magnitude and the extent being similar in these two groups. This shows that
the export diversion effect exists but is not the main driving force, as the creation effect
matters more.
Next, I am concerned about another kind of diversion effect, the diversion of Central Asia
exports between Xinjiang and other regions of China. As shown in Table 3.5, exporters
with longer sped-up mileage will benefit more from the speed-up. It is straightforward to
suppose that exports in Xinjiang (enjoying limited sped-up mileage) will be transferred
to other regions, such as Jiangsu and Zhejiang (coastal regions in Eastern China), which
have a relatively higher manufacturing productivity and competitive advantage from
Xinjiang. Column 5 presents a simple estimation similar to Table 3.5. Xinjiang is a
dummy variable equal to 1 for Xinjiang exporters and 0 for others. Within the rail freight
exports, Xinjiang exporters have weaker performance than their competitors in other
regions after the speed-up. Referring to the estimated coefficient, Xinjiang exporters
with rail freight saw a decrease of 31% in export values in 2001, compared with that in
2000 and that for exporters in other regions.
Additionally, in column 6, I conduct an alternative estimation to evaluate this diversion
effect. For a product that is exported to Central Asia both by Xinjiang exporters and
exporters in other regions in 2000, I set it as a “both” product with a value equal to 1,
and for other product exports taken by either Xinjiang exporters or exporters in other
regions, the variable is equal to 0. Within Xinjiang exports, I find that the export value
of “both” products decline compared to other products in Xinjiang, by 39% in 2001
compared to their 2000 level. Columns 5 and 6 suggest that Xinjiang exporters are
negatively affected by the diversion effect from the speed-up.
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Table 3.9: Two kinds of diversion effects
Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Freight mode (rail&non-rail) Origin (Xinjiang&others)
Multiple: f-p-c Single: f-p-c Multiple: p Single: p Full Within Xinjiang
Rail×y2001 0.4057*** 0.0768*** 0.0903*** 0.1054***
(0.1346) (0.0144) (0.0237) (0.0262)
Xinjiang×y2001 -0.0418*
(0.0222)
Both×y2001 -0.0656**
(0.0319)
Samples all rail
Observations 1120 11796 7650 5266 5102 2092
R-squared 0.0244 0.0029 0.0053 0.0025 0.0013 0.0021
Notes: Same as Tables 3.4 and 3.6.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In Table 3.10, I test the differential domestic access improvement effects with respect
to time saving and capacity expansion. The speed-up improves both railway speed and
cargo capacity. Perishable products are most sensitive to travel time, while machinery
are generally capacity sensitive. I test using these two products to distinguish between
the role of time and capacity effects. In column 1, I conduct an estimation of equation (2)
within food exports, and in column 3, I restrict samples within rail freight exports and
set a dummy variable for food (equal to 1 for food exports and 0 for others). Although
in the first estimation I chose non-rail freight food exports as the control, and in column
3 I set rail freight non-food exports as the control, interaction terms of both estimations
capture the time effect. In columns 2 and 4, I use machinery exports instead of food
and run the same estimations with columns 1 and 3, interaction terms thus capturing
the capacity effect. Obviously, the time effect is not statistically significant in columns 1
and 3, while machinery exports benefit from the speed-up significantly, by 31% (column
1) and 45% (column 3). Results suggest that capacity expansion is more important than
time saving for railways16.
Finally, I test the speed-up effect on exports from the viewpoint of extensive/intensive
margin effects. For the extensive margin, I estimate the variation in the number of
exporters to the speed-up project, followed by Equation 3.4. The dependent variable is
the number of exporters in product (HS-8)-country-freight mode-year level. Rail and
the y2001 dummy and equation settings are identical to Equation 3.2.
Number.Exportersp,c,t,y = α0 + α1Railp,c,y + α2Railp,c,y × y2001p,c,t + α3y2001p,c,t + p,c,t,y.
(3.4)
16However, the insignificant time effect might be latently caused by two facts: food exported to Central
Asia is not always perishable. For example, wheat flour and rice are not so sensitive to time in trade,
while perishable products like fruits are rarely exported to Central Asia. The travel time saved by the
speed-up in freight trains is not as much as in passenger trains.
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Table 3.10: Distinguishing between time and capacity effects
Export Value
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Time-sensitive Capacity-sensitive Time-sensitive Capacity-sensitive
Rail×y2001 0.0068 0.0659*
(0.0134) (0.0392)
Food×y2001 0.0022
(0.0412)
Machinery×y2001 0.0966***
(0.0250)
Samples Food Machinery Rail Rail
Observations 1032 2586 5102 5102
R-squared 0.0069 0.0046 0.0006 0.0035
Notes: Same as Tables 3.4 and 3.6.
Time-sensitive: Food refers to products with HS-2 (01-24).
Capacity-sensitive: Machinery and equipment refer to products with HS-2 (84-89).
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In column 1 of Table 3.11, results show that the number of exporters increased by
8% (mean of the related indicator is 1.40 in 2000) because of the railway speed-up.
Magnitude of the extensive margin effect is not large, in spite of positive and significant
coefficients. This is latently caused by the diversion effect, as shown in columns 5 and
6 of Table 3.9. Due to the railway speed-up and improvement in domestic accessibility
to Xinjiang, on the one hand, exporters in other regions tended to participate in the
Central Asian market. On the other, Xinjiang exporters tended to exit this market due
to weak competitive power. In this case, extensive margin is not significant, if the overall
exporters do not increase, even if there is a switch between exporters in Xinjiang and
other regions. In columns 2 and 3, I separately test the extensive margin for Xinjiang
exporters and exporters from other regions to avoid such an offset effect. Results suggest
that this is not the case, as the extensive margin is limited, even if taking into account
the offset effect. For Xinjiang exporters, there is no significant decrease in the number
of exporters, and for other regions, the extensive margin is significantly positive but the
extent is still less than 10%. In column 4, I estimate at the product (HS-4)-country
level instead of the product (HS-8)-country level, with result being unchanged, in both
significance and magnitude of the extensive margin (around 8%).
On the intensive margin effect, I keep only the existing exporters at the firm-product-
country level that have export records in 2000 and run estimations of Equation 3.2. The
promotion effect is 58% in export value (column 5) and 23% in the number of shipments
(column 7), which is only slightly smaller than the results with the full sample. In
columns 6 and 8, I present the results of Equation 3.3 when keeping only the samples
from existing exporters and rail freight exports. Results are similar to that of the full
samples (containing the new exporters in 2001). Based on these estimations, results
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suggest that intensive margins play a major role, with the speed-up effect on exports
originating from extensive margins being limited.
Table 3.11: Distinguishing between extensive and intensive margins
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Number of Exporters Export Value Number of Shipments
Rail×y2001 0.1048*** -0.0415 0.0727*** 0.1447*** 0.1068*** 0.4651***
(0.0365) (0.0455) (0.0241) (0.0523) (0.0256) (0.0585)
Mileage×y2001 0.0051*** 0.0807***
(0.0028) (0.0086)
Samples all only exclude all existing existing existing existing
Xinjiang Xinjiang &rail &rail
Sample type p(HS8)-c p(HS8)-c p(HS8)-c p(HS4)-c f-p-c f-p-c f-p-c f-p-c
Observations 6990 3530 4256 3918 8052 3138 8052 3138
R-squared 0.0221 0.0303 0.0026 0.0223 0.0139 0.0099 0.2693 0.3214
Notes: Same as Tables 3.4 and 3.6.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Based on a series of estimations, the big picture of the channels of the speed-up effect
on export becomes clear. In the total speed-up effect (increase in related exports by
69%, as in baseline estimations (Table 3.4), and at least 27% in robustness checks, after
removing various disturbances (Tables 3.7 and 3.8)), the export creation effect plays the
main role (column 2 of Table 3.9), with a limited diversion effect from non-rail to rail
freight exports (column 1 of Table 3.9). Within rail freight exports, to some extent, it
is transferred from Xinjiang exporters to exporters from other regions of China (mainly
the coastal regions), because of improvement in accessibility to Xinjiang (columns 5
and 6 of Table 3.9). Capacity expansion is the more direct factor promoting export
rather than the increased speed (Table 3.10). I use only a short period (two years)
data, as exporters might not choose to enter/exit markets immediately in response to
the railway speed-up, but existing exporters increase/decrease the related exports, as a
result of which, intensive margin becomes a major source of the speed-up effect (Table
3.11).
3.5.2 Heterogeneous effects with respect to unit price of exporting
products and firm size
As per the opinion of the World Bank (2006), interior cities in China are more likely to be
able to compete in the production of bulk goods (e.g., coal) suitable for leisurely shipment
or high-value goods (e.g., computer chips) suitable for air cargo. Transport will tend to
have the most deleterious impact on medium-value goods for inland cities of China, and
hence, they are most sensitive to improvement in transport. To consider this, I divide
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the exported products into three categories, with an equal number of items in each
classification, based on the unit price: low-, medium-, and high-value products. Table
3.12 gives results consistent with World Bank (2006). Both the estimations with the
dependent variable as the export value and the number of shipments present significant
promotion effects for medium-value products. For low-value products, neither of the
results is significant. That is, low value products tend to enjoy leisurely shipment, thus
are not sensitive to the increased speed and capacity in rail. Actually, when I restrict the
samples in raw material exports (that enjoy leisurely shipment), there is no significant
speed-up effect observed (results are available upon request). For high-value products,
results are not consistent, with the test with respect to export value being significantly
positive while the test with respect to the number of shipments being insignificant,
suggesting that the speed-up project raised the export value per shipment for high-value
products. It is a reasonable assumption, because exports to Central Asia are dominated
by low- and medium-value products. Even for high-value products in this classification
(not less than 4 USD in unit price), most of them cannot afford air cargo. As shown
in Section 4, the number of shipments is not increased as much as the export value
from the speed-up project, ensuring that the insignificant result on column 6 is not
contradictory to that on column 3. Overall, the export of medium-value products is
promoted by 135%, for high-value products it is 86%, while for low-value products it is
insignificant17.
Then, on the firm sizes of exporters, there is no data directly corresponding to the size.
I use the average value per shipment to be representative of the firm size. Specifically,
I calculate the mean of export value per shipment for each firm, based on the data of
2000-2001, and set the medium value as the threshold. Firms whose average export value
per shipment is larger than the medium value are viewed as a large firm and as a small
firm otherwise. Results in Table 3.13 are significant for two kinds of exporters, and for
two indicators: export value and the number of shipments. However, the extent is very
different. For large exporters, rail freight export in 2001 increased by 85% compared to
that in 2000, and that for small exporters is relatively small, by 25%. On the number of
shipments, the difference becomes much smaller, with 16% and 13%, respectively. Large
exporters benefit more than small exporters in the speed-up. This is reasonable, as larger
17I test the variation on the unit price itself. I use the unit price instead of export value as the
dependent variable for the samples that have records in both the years. Results are not significant, as
shown in Table B.5. The unit price is the F.O.B. price, containing the producer’s price and domestic
freight costs. Within the f-p-c level, there is no actual price change, since the speed-up does not directly
decrease monetary freight costs. Although there might be an indirect decrease in freight costs because
of capacity expansion and relieved congestion (as suggested by Li and Chen (2013)), and the increasing
returns in transportation (as suggested by Mori (2012)), if exporters increase their export volume, it is
reasonable that the unit price does not react immediately to cost change. Lu et al. (2013) estimate the
unit price effect of China’s export response to US anti-dumping investigations, although export volume
greatly decreased and though the anti-dumping duty is high, up from 44%-300% of the export value,
the unit price does not change significantly.
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Table 3.12: Effect of products with different unit prices
Export Value Number of Shipment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Low Medium High Low Medium High
Rail×y2001 0.0199 0.1040*** 0.1394*** 0.0550 0.3127*** 0.0691
(0.0168) (0.0355) (0.0347) (0.1014) (0.0851) (0.0651)
Observations 4026 4804 4086 4026 4804 4086
R-squared 0.0032 0.0050 0.0033 0.0127 0.0458 0.0006
Notes: Same as Tables 3.4 and 3.6.
Low: F.O.B. price not-higher-than 0.8 USD; Medium: F.O.B. price higher than 0.8 and lower than 4
USD; High: F.O.B. price not-lower-than 4 USD. Price is based on the average unit price at firm-product-
country-freight mode level in 2000.
Top 5 categories (based on export value) in low value products, HS-2 in rail: 27, 9, 28, 73, and 55; HS-2
in non-rail: 58, 61, 54, 95, and 63.
27: Coal, Asphalt, Lubricating oils, Vaseline, etc.;
9: Tea, Coffee beans, Paprika, etc.;
28: Chemical products (Iodine, Calcium, Phosphorus, etc.);
73: Pipes, Screws, Steel building materials, etc.;
55: Fabrics;
58: Various textiles;
61: Suits, Coats, Skirts, Sportswear, Shirts, Trousers, Underwear, etc.;
54: Cloth and Gauze;
95: Toys, Pokers, Accessories of sporting goods;
63: Bedspreads, Bath towels, Rags, etc.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
exporters are more likely to be restricted by railway cargo capacity, and by increasing
the cargo capacity, they benefited more from the increasing returns of transportation.
Table 3.13: Size of the exporters
Export Value Number of Shipment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Large Small Large Small
Rail×y2001 0.1537*** 0.0037*** 0.3093*** 0.1801***
(0.0276) (0.0012) (0.0697) (0.0501)
Observations 8150 4766 8150 4766
R-squared 0.0059 0.0014 0.0322 0.0021
Notes: Same as Tables 3.4 and 3.6.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
3.6 Exports of Xinjiang
In this section, I investigate the overall speed-up effect on the export performance of the
Xinjiang, the gateway of China to Central Asia. As shown in previous results, there is a
diversion of exports from Xinjiang to other regions. In the case of high transportation
costs, Xinjiang enjoys a locational advantage for Central Asian export, and it thus
becomes the main exporter to Central Asia, although it does not have comprehensive
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comparative advantages in productivity. However, due to increasing market accessibility
for other regions to Xinjiang, the importance of the productivity advantage matters
more, which negatively affects Xinjiang’s comparative advantages. As mentioned in
Mori (2012), when the travel time between Tokyo and Osaka (the two largest cities,
also the two largest transportation hubs in Japan) decreased from 20 hours (1889), to
8 hours (1935), and further to 2.5 hours (2005), the population size in Tokyo was 1.1
(1889), 1.6 (1935), and 2.7 times (2005) as large as in Osaka. This is similar to the
ratio of exports to Central Asia provided by the Xinjiang exporters. In 2010, 70% of
exports that exited China through Urumqi customs (most to Central Asia, few to Middle
East, etc.) are from non-Xinjiang exporters (Wu, 2011). While in 2000, non-Xinjiang
exporters accounted for only 29% of the exports to Central Asia (Source: Customs
database). This huge transformation happens consistently throughout the decade, as
China experienced sharp expansion of transportation infrastructure.
On the other hand, except the Central Asian market, the speed-up also increased the
market accessibility to other international markets for exporters in Xinjiang. Xinjiang
exporters might gain higher accessibility to China’s coastal lines and ports, as well as
markets in Japan, US, etc. Although Xinjiang does not have comparative advantages in
export compared to coastal regions because of its remoteness to the coast, it has com-
parative advantages in specific heavy industry production that is heavily dependent on
energy and raw materials, since it has a rich endowment of mineral resources. Previous
quantitative evidence has proven that domestic accessibility is important to export par-
ticipation, and hence, I estimate the speed-up effect on export performance of Xinjiang
exporters to other international markets except Central Asia.
Similar to the exports from Eastern China to Central Asia, exports from Xinjiang have
to experience the land route through the Silk Road to reach the coastal lines in the case
of ocean shipping to destination countries. I extract the export records from Xinjiang
exporters, and go in two directions: countries that are located to the west of Xinjiang,
namely, Central Asia and the Middle East, for which goods exit China through Urumqi
customs. This direction is less affected by the railway speed-up and the domestic freight
distance is short. Another direction is countries for which goods are freighted through
ocean shipping, like Japan, US, etc., that is, these exports have to experience long-haul
domestic freight from Xinjiang to coastal ports, like Tianjin, Shanghai, or Guangzhou
ports. Among these ports, Shanghai is the most frequently used, based on export records.
If products are moved by railways, then to reach the Shanghai port, they have to use
almost the full length of both the Lanxin and the Longhai lines, which were sped-up in
Oct. 2000. This provides a good opportunity to observe the railway speed-up effects
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when I limit the export samples of Xinjiang exporters, and go for two exit customs:
Urumqi and Shanghai18.
I identify the domestic accessibility change, based on the exiting customs. Rail freight
exports from Xinjiang exporters exiting through Urumqi customs are set as the control
group, and rail freight exports from Xinjiang exporters exiting through Shanghai customs
are set as the treatment group. Estimation equation is as follows, ShanghaiCustom is a
dummy variable, equal to 1 if the transaction is finished in Shanghai customs and 0 if it
exits China through Urumqi. Other variables and equation settings are identical with
Equation 3.2:
ExportValuef,p,c,y = α0 + α1ShanghaiCustomf,p,c,y + α2ShanghaiCustomf,p,c,y × y2001f,p,c
+α3y2001f,p,c + f,p,c,y
.
(3.5)
An identification problem arises from this estimation strategy. For the exports from
Xinjiang exiting through Urumqi (control group), it is easy to identify the domestic
freight mode from the customs database (the freight mode when exiting China). For the
treated group, exports from Xinjiang to countries like Japan and the US, the domestic
freight mode might be roads or rail, but the exiting mode is ocean shipping. Customs
data records only the exiting freight mode in ocean shipping, but does not present the
domestic modes for each transaction. In such cases, I divide them based on the export
records from Eastern China to Central Asia (the opposite direction), since they need to
experience the same domestic route. Specifically, for one kind of export product (HS-2
level), if exports from Eastern China to Central Asia are mainly freighted by rail/road,
then I assume in exports from Xinjiang to the coast, it is also freighted by rail/road.
18Although for some export cases, it is possible to, firstly, use rail or roads to reach the Yangtze
River (from Xinjiang to Chongqing, or Wuhan), and then transfer on the Yangtze riverside, that is, they
transfer to ship freight, and finally exit China through the Yangtze River. Such cases are rare, since the
Yangtze River is far from the Silk Road, so it is not advisable to use the Yangtze River for transport
from Xinjiang to Shanghai.
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This is reasonable, as the products freighted by rail and road are naturally different1920.
Table 3.14: Export performance of Xinjiang
Export Value Number of Shipment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ShanghaiCustom 0.0754*** 0.1238*** 0.0552 1.6801*** 1.4831*** 0.2454
×y2001 (0.0320) (0.0322) (0.0572) (0.1260) (0.1233) (0.2137)
Samples
#treated (Shanghai) rail rail road rail rail road
#control (Urumqi) rail road road rail road road
Observations 1976 4852 4510 1976 4852 4510
R-squared 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.091 0.042 0.030
Notes: Same as Tables 3.4 and 3.6.
I extract only the export records of the first eight months (Jan.-Aug.) of the related years to relieve
the “Sept. 11 Attack” effects, and exclude the postal and air freight exports, and government donation
exports.
Standard errors in parentheses
*, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
In columns 1 and 4 of Table 3.14, for both treated and controlled samples, I restrict only
for rail freight goods. Results suggest that after the railway speed-up, Xinjiang exporters
increased their exports through Shanghai customs, as compared to that through Urumqi
customs, by 70% in export value and 144% in number of shipments. For the latter,
it is obviously larger than in the opposite direction and suggests that the speed-up
benefits the small-sized exporters in Xinjiang. Then, I conduct estimations with the road
19I identify the freight mode from Xinjiang to the coast based on the two-digit customs classification
code (HS-2) that mostly exports in the opposite direction. The eight-digit customs classification code
(HS-8), with specific goods and the related freight mode, is a possible exercise in this case, but I find
in the HS-8 level, export products moving from Xinjiang to the coast, and export products moving
from Eastern China to Central Asia via Xinjiang, are totally different. In the HS-2 level, I find that
trains convey most of the heavy industry products, while trucks mainly convey light industry products.
Precisely, I divide the export records based on HS-2, and then choose the top ten categories in export
value. In these top 10 categories, I identify each category with its related freight mode: railway or
road, based on the main freight modes for the same category in China-Central Asia export (opposite
direction). The top ten categories in HS-2 (based on export value) are: 85, 52, 29, 84, 60, 61, 82, 62, 55,
and 63. I keep only 85, 52, 29, 84, and 82 as railway freighted, since in China-Central Asia export, such
exports are mainly taken by rail, and they are heavy industry products (82,84,85: machine tools, 52:
chemical raw materials) and agricultural products (55: cotton). For 60-63 and 55, they are light industry
products (textiles, fabrics, clothes, etc.) and are mainly road freighted. These top five heavy industry
products account for 39.3% of the total exports from Xinjiang (22.8% in the number of shipments). In
columns 1 and 4, I choose the treated samples (Shanghai customs) as exports of these five categories,
and the control samples (Urumqi customs) as rail freighted exports from Xinjiang.
20I am also concerned about the fact that if exports from the same firm with the same destination
country and product might exit China through different customs, my identification might be affected
by this endogeneity. That is, because of the speed-up, for the same firm, product, and destination
country, the exit port might change to meet the higher freight efficiency, such as transfers from Dalian
to Shanghai ports. This will also increase the exports through the Shanghai port. I evaluate such cases
as follows: if in the f-p-c level, there is at least one transaction that occurred in Shanghai customs in
2000-2001, I assume that for this f-p-c level data, all the transactions in 2000-2001 are seen as having
occurred in Shanghai, even if some transactions actually occurred at other customs. The fact is that
such cases are rather rare in exports from Xinjiang, less than 200 cases in two years. For the same f-p-c
level export, if firms choose to exit from the Shanghai customs, in most cases, they will not use other
ports of exit. Thus, the concern about switching ports could be omitted.
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freight exports as control samples. As the rail freight exports from Xinjiang through
Urumqi customs tend to be transferred to coastal exporters based on the results of
Table 3.9, thus the control group in estimations of columns 1 and 4 are also affected by
treatment. However, road freight exports of Xinjiang (exit through Urumqi customs) are
not affected by this kind of diversion effect. Results in columns 2 and 5 are consistent.
Significant export promotion effects still exist, and the placebo tests in columns 3 and 6
are insignificant when I include road freight exports in both treated and control samples,
that is, neither of the groups is affected by the speed-up project.
For the export flows from Xinjiang to China’s coast, I do not conduct a series of esti-
mations investigating the channels, because identification on freight mode is not feasible
due to data restrictions. However, the limited results are still informative. The overall
effects to Xinjiang from this sudden exogenous variation are two-fold. A higher domes-
tic market access induces the declining locational advantage of Xinjiang as the gateway
from China to Central Asia. However, better domestic market access also improves
the accessibility of Xinjiang to international markets through the coast. When talking
about the overall export performance of Xinjiang, although there is a temporary de-
cline in export value in 2001 (partially because of the “Sept. 11 Attack”), from 2002, it
continues to rapidly grow in terms of international trade. In the Tenth Five-Year Plan
period (2001-2005), its annual trade growth was 28.5% (33.2% in exports and 22.3% in
imports), much higher than its GDP growth of 10.1% and total investment in fixed asset
growth of 17.2%, in these five years. This figure was also higher than the national annual
trade growth of 24.6% (Source: Statistical Communiqua´ of the National Economic and
Social Development, 2005).
3.7 Conclusion
I investigate the effect of domestic accessibility improvement on export performance,
using the variation from China’s railway speed-up in west-east lines. I find that ex-
ports from China to Central Asia through railways increased by (at least) around 30%
after the railway speed-up, compared with exports through other freight modes. Do-
mestic accessibility proves to be important to international trade participation, and it
has heterogeneous effects on products and exporters (medium-value products and large
exporters benefit more). The speed-up caused re-organization of exports, in terms of
location of exporters and freight modes. Capacity expansion is the more direct factor
promoting export, rather than the increased speed. Intensive margin proves to be the
major source of the speed-up effect, not the extensive margin.
Chapter 3. Speeding-Up of Railways and Exports 61
For a specific region, the net welfare gains of Xinjiang, the gateway of China to Central
Asia, from the speed-up project are mixed. Xinjiang exporters have fewer exports to
Central Asia, but more to other international markets, like the US and Japan. By
increasing transportation efficiency, the locational advantage as the gateway is changing,
and Xinjiang’s economic development is thus affected in its export structure.
Although China-Central Asia export is not crucial, in the sense of export value, to the
Chinese economy, the implication of domestic accessibility could be extended. First, so-
cial returns from railway investments prove to be considerable and prospective. Railways
hold a considerable share of freight for raw materials in China, but for manufacturing
goods, its share is less than 15% (China Transportation Yearbook, 2006). Trucks are
still the dominant freight mode, undertaking 72% of the total freight in China (Annual
Report of Ministry of Transport of P. R. China, 2006). This is highly confounding, since
trains have a lower per unit cost in long-haul freight than trucks. Effective investment
on improving railway freight efficiency is supposed to be promising.
Second, transportation infrastructure investment is always beneficial to overall national
welfare, but not necessarily to specific regions. China pushes forward to reach balanced
regional development between coastal regions and inland, landlocked regions, and puts
a priority on investment in inland regions, such as the “Go-West Campaign.” Trans-
port infrastructure in these regions is heavily supported. On the one hand, higher
domestic accessibility helps productive inland exporters to participate in exports, with
the exported products of inland regions enjoying comparative advantages. On the other,
China tries to extend domestic demand instead of an export-oriented economy for future
economic growth, which is seen as an opportunity for the development of inland regions
because of huge local populations, and potentially strong local demand. However, with
high domestic accessibility, coastal regions tend to dominate both the international and
the domestic inland markets (manufacturing sector), if the coastal regions retain their
competitive power. It is necessary for policymakers to consider this trade-off.
Chapter 4
The Role of Coal Mine
Regulation in Regional
Development1
4.1 Introduction
Coal is the dominant primary energy in China, accounting for approximately 80% of
China’s energy structure and 70% of its primary energy consumption. In addition, over
90% of China’s coal consumption is domestically provided. China’s coal mining and
coal industry are therefore crucial for the social economy. Consistent with high coal
production, coal mine accidents are frequent in China and have been considerably more
highlighted. China produces 35% of global coal. However, because of insufficient safety
facilities and poor mining productivity, coal mine deaths in China account for 80% of
the global coal industry mortality (2003). The overall coalmine labor productivity is
also low, reaching approximately 2.2% of that of the United States in 2003. One of the
main reasons for this is the small-size town and village enterprise (TVE) coal mines once
permitted in China.
These poor conditions have prompted the Chinese government to promote regulation in
the coal industry. China has regulated the coal industry since the 1990s by expanding
fixed-asset investments and by closing small-sized mines with low productivity and high
1This is a joint-work with Kentaro Nakajima. We thank Ching-mu Chen, Dao-Zhi Zeng, Huihui Deng,
Jae Hong Kim, Zhao Chen, Yuan Zhang, Ruixiang Xiong, Zhikuo Liu, Jianfeng Wu, and participants
of the Third Asian Seminar in Regional Science (Hualien), seminars in Tohoku University (GSIS), and
Fudan University (CCES) for the valuable comments. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support
from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) (#22223003) and from the JSPS Research
Fellowship for Young Scientists (DC2). All errors are ours.
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mortality rates. However, as shown previously, China’s productivity rates and mine
accidents are still far from satisfactory. In 2008, mortality accounted for 70% of the
world total; however, this number has improved since the 1990s. From 1997 to 2009,
the mortality rate (death worker/ton) declined by 80%, labor productivity (ton/worker)
improved by 205%, and national coal output increased by 123% (sources: Statistical
Communique´ of the National Economic and Social Development and the China Coal
Industry Yearbook).
In this study, regulation is evaluated in terms of regional economic growth. According
to the existing arguments on the resource curse and its effect mechanism on economic
performance, the crowding-out effect (which suggests that resource abundance crowds
out investment, human capital, and innovation in non-resource sectors and thus hinders
economic growth) is a main cause of the resource curses in many regions globally (see,
e.g., Sachs and Warner, 1995; 2001; Frankel, 2010). In addition, strong institutions can
help avoid the resource curse, whereas weak institutions deteriorate it (Hodler, 2006;
Andersen and Aslaksen, 2007; Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 2010). By upgrading the
regulation and management of coal mines, coal mining productivity is improved and the
crowding-out effect is expected to be relieved. Under this background, by investigating
the relief of crowding-out effects, we investigate whether China’s coal mine regulation has
positively affected the economic growth of regions with high coal industry dependence
since the 1990s.
Our analysis is as follows. To guide our empirical investigations, we develop a sim-
ple framework that shows the relationship between the resource crowding-out effects
of entrepreneurs and regional economic growth. Without reasonable regulation, en-
trepreneurs tend to flock to the coal mining industry because of high profit; thus, they
lower the overall productivity of both the coal mining industry (with economies of scale)
and other industries (with economies of agglomeration).
Regarding the empirical strategy estimating the effects of regulation on regional de-
velopment, first, we apply two difference-in-difference (DID) approaches. The first is
a comparison between the pre- and post-regulation periods as well as between regions
with and without rich small-size coal mines, and we find that regions with rich small-size
coal mines are more affected by the regulation. The second is a comparison between the
pre- and post-regulation periods as well as between regions rich in coal mines and those
rich in other mines (except coal mines). We find positive economic spillover effects of
regulation on both the whole regional economy and the non-coal based economy. Then,
using a robustness check of the regulation effects, the key and most difficult procedure
is finding a good measurement for coal industry regulation. Because regulation is a
complex and comprehensive policy, a computable official indicator is not available. We
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present arguments showing that mortality rate in coal mining is a suitable proxy for
the quality of coal mine regulation. Using provincial-level panel data from 1995–2009,
we confirm that coal mine regulation positively improved the economic performance of
related regions. The results remain stable under various settings and are strengthened
using indicators for wage instead of for per capita GDP. The positive effects are observed
not only in the coal industry but also in other economic activities, and we address these
spillover effects to the moderation of natural resource crowding-out effects.
This study contributes to recent studies on the relationship between institutions and the
resource curse. Although most studies associated with the resource curse and institutions
address overall social institutions, this study is concerned with the coal industry; thus,
controlling endogeneity is easier, and the institution effect can be more directly observed.
Then, although empirical works such as Angrist and Kugler (2008) and Sala-i-Martin
and Subramanian (2003) confirm that a relationship exists between poor institutions and
poor economic performance in some resource-dependent countries, they did not confirm
this using the dynamic improvements of the institutions. In this study, we attempt to
empirically show that the improving management of natural resources can positively
affect the social economy of related regions.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 contains a brief re-
view of issues related to the relationship between the resource curse and institutions and
those related to the within-country resource curse. Section 4.3 presents an introduction
to China’s coal industry regulation, and Section 4.4 shows the theoretical framework.
Sections 4.5 and 4.6 provide the empirical results on regulation effects. Section 4.7
presents the mechanisms of regulation quality affecting regional development, and Sec-
tion 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Resource curse
4.2.1 Resource curse and institutions
Natural resource endowments generate economic gains in related regions but may provide
few sources of income to local people because of poor resource policies. Accounts of both
the relationship between the resource curse and poor social institutions and resource
policies are available in many cross- and within-country studies.
Natural resources cause fighting between rivaling groups, which reduces productive activ-
ities and weakens property rights, making productive activities less attractive. Natural
resources lower incomes in fractionalized countries but increase incomes in homogenous
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countries (Hodler, 2006). Andersen and Aslaksen (2007) indicate that the so-called
resource curse is present in democratic presidential countries but not in democratic par-
liamentary ones. Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010) predict that resource rents cause
an increase in corruption only if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively
poor. The relationship between resource rents and corruption depends on the quality of
the democratic institutions.
Empirically, a series of studies find the positive relationship between poor institution
and poor economic performance around the natural resource. An unexpected boom in
the demands for coca leaf in Columbia increases its employment opportunity, however,
due to the weak institution and civilian conflict, rural regions in Columbia with high
coca production become more violent but not go to prosperity (Angrist and Kugler,
2008). Caselli and Michaels (2013) find that living standards have not been improved
although revenue and reported government expenditures have greatly increased because
of oil windfall in some regions of Brazil. The “missing money” is accounted for by
embezzlement surrounding the oil windfall. Also, oil revenues per capita in Nigeria
increased by around ten times in the period of 1965-2000, but its income level still
drops in the poorest country group in the world. Violence, waste and corruption from
oil rather than the Dutch disease has been responsible for the poor long-run economic
performance. Improving the quality of public institutions is a method for transforming
economics and politics in such regions (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003).
By contrast, some researchers discuss some positive experiences. As a large oil exporter,
Norway reaches lasting economic growth and least corruption by utilizing well-developed
institution (Larsen, 2006; van der Ploeg, 2011). In Botswana, 40% of the GDP stems
from diamonds, but it has the second highest public expenditure share on education and
enjoys high economic growth (Sarraf and Jiwanji, 2001).
4.2.2 Within-country resource curse
Although the resource curse has been mainly studied using cross-country samples (e.g.,
Sachs and Warner, 1995, 2001; Gylfason, 2001; Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik, 2006),
a substantial amount of literature claims a within-country resource curse. James and
Aadland (2011) and Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2007) find a natural resource curse using
county-level and state-level data showing that mining is negatively related to economic
outcomes across the United States. Deaton and Niman (2012) and James and Aad-
land (2011) argue that in the United States, an area dependent on coal mining is likely
to have deep poverty because of weaker local governance, entrepreneurship, and edu-
cational attainment, as well as environmental degradation, poor health outcomes, and
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limited other economic opportunities. Michaels (2011) finds positive evidence for this
point. After oil discovery in the southern United States, related regions reached higher
employment density, higher population growth, and higher per capita income.
For the regional level in China, results of resource curse-related works vary across mea-
surement and estimation strategies. Some studies have argued that within China, the
resource curse exists at the provincial-level through crowding-out of human resource
accumulation and innovation, causing rent-seeking and corruption (Xu and Han, 2005;
Hu and Xiao, 2007; Shao and Qi, 2008). Ji, Magnus, and Wang (2012) analyze a cross-
province sample of China by focusing on the interplay between resource abundance,
institutional quality, and economic growth. They find that resource abundance had a
positive effect on economic growth at the provincial-level between 1990 and 2008 that
depended non-linearly on institutional quality. Ding, Wang, and Deng (2007), Fang,
Ji, and Zhao (2008), and Fan, Fang, and Park (2012) show that there is no significant
evidence to support the existence of a resource curse phenomenon in China at either the
city level or the prefecture level.
4.3 China’s coal mines and coal mine regulation
In the 1980s, to meet the increasing demands of coal in society, the central government of
China began encouraging coal mining wherever possible and by whatever means. A coal
mining license, once not permitted for non-stated-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), became
available to town and village enterprises (TVEs). Thus, TVE coal mines, generally small
and with poor production equipment, began flourishing countrywide. China had 84,000
operating coal mines by the end of 1996, 81,000 of which were small-size TVE mines
with an annual coal output of less than 30,000 tons. In contrast, the United States,
whose total coal production was similar to China’s in 1997, had only 2,196 coal mines
at that time (Pan, Pu, and Xiang, 2002). In the 1990s, almost 60% of the national coal
output in China was generated by small-size TVE mines.
Although TVE coal mines greatly contributed to the energy supply at the time, their
disadvantages were obvious. Most TVE mines had less than 10 workers, but coal mining
is an industry with economies of scale. Serious problems concerning workers’ safety and
their long-run health as well as environmental damage and low productivity (i.e., coal
resource waste) were highlighted throughout the coal resource-rich regions. The typical
exploitation rate of TVE mines was approximately 10%–15%, but some were under
10%. However, the exploitation rate of state-owned key coal mines has generally been
approximately 50%. Thus, in TVE mines, each ton of coal mined wastes approximately
eight tons of coal and discarded resources that cannot be mined repeatedly (Wang, 2006).
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In addition, coal mining licenses have created significant rent-seeking and corruption
opportunities for the local economy. Because of the large number of small-size mines,
management of the coal industry has become very difficult.
Further, the prosperity of small-size TVE mines indirectly reduces the competitiveness
of large-size SOE mines. Coal is a product with no diversity preferences, that is, there
is no preference as to whether it comes from a large-size SOE mine with developed
facilities and skilled employees or from a small-size TVE mine with rough facilities and
unskilled employees: It can be sold to the same customer at the same price. However,
although SOE mines have higher labor productivity, they face a higher sunk cost and
heavier social burdens (e.g., issues such as recovery of destroyed environment, safety and
medical insurance for employees, and education of employees’ children). By contrast,
TVE mines, particularly illegal mines, can hire enough employees with a relatively low
wage and without other social costs. Compared to the high coal price for TVE mines,
production costs are relatively low.
As a result, TVE mines flourish but cause serious social problems; however, SOE mines
are unprofitable and uncompetitive (non-profitability of SOEs was found across many
industries in China in the 1990s. Since then, China has experienced large-scale reform of
SOEs countrywide). China’s coal industry has become disordered, coal mine accidents
are increasingly frequent, and the regional economy has been negatively affected. In the
mid-1990s, the central government decided to regulate the coal industry, because most
accidents happened in TVE mines where they lacked investments in production safety
and where employees mainly comprised the surrounding agricultural population (i.e.,
they lack knowledge and training in coal mining). Thus, most small-size TVE mines
have been gradually closed, and coal mining licenses have been restricted to small-size
mining entrants. The remainder of the small-size mines have been required to improve
their technology and facilities or to merge with large-size SOE mines.
Policy outcomes have been satisfactory. As discussed in Section 1, the coal mining
mortality rate was reduced by 80% and productivity improved by 205% during the
period 1997–2009. Although small-size mines have been largely closed, total national
coal production has not been reduced; alternatively, it has increased gradually because
the exploitation rate in large-size mines has increased. Hence, the degree of industry
concentration has increased rapidly. The production share of the largest four or eight
enterprises within an industry (C4 and C8, respectively) is a general indicator of in-
dustry concentration in a country. The degree of coal industry concentration is high
in almost all main coal-producing countries whether they are developed or developing
economies: The United States (C4 is 45%), South Africa (C4 is 87%), Germany (C4 is
65%), and Australia (C4 is 50%). In India, more than 90% of total coal is produced
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by one enterprise (source: Authors’ own collection from various sources). Although still
low, the degree of industry concentration (C4) in China increased from 6.9% in 1996 to
20% in 2009 (Pan, Pu, and Xiang, 2002). Because coal is crucial to China’s energy sup-
ply and coal mines in China are only located in specific regions, the economies of these
regions are particularly affected by coal. Therefore, strong coal mine regulation and
significant changes in the coal industry should be associated with their recent economic
performance, making this research interesting and informative.
4.4 Theoretical framework
To provide guidance for our empirical analysis, this section presents a simple framework
that formalizes the effects of coal mine regulation on regional development. Following
the framework by Torvik (2002), two sectors exist in the region: a coal mining sector (c)
and other sectors (o). The total number of entrepreneurs (G) is provided exogenously.
Entrepreneurs can choose to engage in one of the two sectors such that G = Gc+Go. Gc
is the number of entrepreneurs engaging in the mining sector, and Go is that engaging
in the other sectors.
The mineral reserves (R) are provided exogenously, and the total amount is divided
equally to all mining entrepreneurs such that each mining entrepreneur holds the same
amount of resources. The total output in the coal mining sector is Fc, which is a function
of Gc and R (which is provided), and
∂Fc(Gc)
∂Gc
< 0 (in the coal mining sector, a high degree
of concentration indicates high industrial productivity (i.e., economies of scale) because
of huge sunk costs). The profit for each mining entrepreneur is set to be homogeneous,
that is, pic =
Fc
Gc
.
fo(Go) is the profit for each entrepreneur engaging in other sectors, and it is a function
of Go. We assume
∂fo(Go)
∂Go
> 0, that is, agglomeration economies exist in other sectors,
and high firm density indicates high productivity.
The equilibrium is reached when pic = pio, that is, for each entrepreneur, no profit
difference is seen between the two sectors, FcGc = fo.
We set the total social profit function (i.e., the total profit of both sectors) as
Total Profit (TP) = Fc(Gc) + fo(Go)×Go.
The equilibrium is thus
TP = fo(Go)×Gc + fo(Go)×Go = fo(Go)×G.
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Figure 4.1: The relationship between entrepreneurs and productivity
The first-order partial differential to Gc is
∂TP
∂Gc
=
∂fo(Go)
∂Gc
= −f ′o(Go) < 0.
Proposition (relief of crowding-out effects): When the central government chooses
to close small-size coal mines, coal mining entrepreneurs move from the coal mining
industry to other sectors (i.e., Go increases), the total profit of both sectors increases,
and the relief of crowding-out effects improves the overall social output.
As shown in Figure 4.1, with no restrictions on Gc, entrepreneurs naturally move from
other sectors to coal mining because pic is always larger than pio until point A, pio = pic =
piA. The social welfare is piA ×G.
When the government places restrictions on Gc (point B in Figure 4.1), Go is fixed
as well. Because the profit of coal mining is higher than other sectors at point B,
profit differences exist attributed to tax, markup, or corruption. In sum, the social
welfare becomes piB × G > piA × G. We can observe an increase in social welfare by
closing small-size mines (although we assume that size is homogeneous in the model,
real coal mining firms are of different sizes and small-size mines are closed first when Gc
is restricted. This does not affect the conclusion: Crowding-out effects are relieved when
the industrial concentration degree of the coal mining industry is increased). Ideally,
coal mining should be undertaken by a single firm to reach the highest productivity.
However, because of geographical features, the coal mining industry may not be highly
concentrated in China.
This setting is reasonable and may be explained by Figure 4.2. After the 1980s, easing
the policies on TVE coal mines caused the number of TVE mines to increase rapidly
in China, peaking at approximately 100,000 TVE mines in 1991. In 1997, the central
government began rectifying TVE coal mines that failed to meet basic safety standards,
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Figure 4.2: The number of TVE coal mines in China
Figure 4.3: Employment in China’s coal mining industry
Note: For most small-size coal mines, employment is not counted in the statistical yearbook; thus, after
regulation, the actual reduction in coal mining employment should be much greater.
and over 10,000 mines were closed that year. The government has increased its efforts
since then, requiring all unregistered illegal mines to be shut down. By the end of 2010,
the number of TVE mines had been reduced to approximately 10,000. Thus, over 85%
of small-size coal mines have been closed since 1997. Furthermore, employment in the
coal mining industry decreased sharply in the regulated period (Figure 4.3). Therefore,
the setting of Gc is acceptable.
Another important issue concerning the model is the firm size and economies of scale in
coal mining. In the model, we set the productivity in coal mining to be positively corre-
lated with firm size. Coal mining is an industry with economies of scale, and, intuitively,
small-size mine owners should have the incentive to merge and reach higher productivity
and profits. However, typical cases in China do not follow this logic, possibly for four
reasons.
First, there is no incentive for mine owners to put considerably investments in coal mining
because of an unstable coal mining policy. The mining license might be withdrawn by
the government, and mine owners are therefore more concerned with short-term profits
rather than long-term ones. Thus, they try to maximize exploitation while the mines are
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still in operation. Second, coal mining requires little knowledge and few skilled workers.
Therefore, employees are pulled from the agricultural population, that is, mining wages
may be rather low2, and labor substitutes for advanced technology. Third, unlike other
industries, the investment threshold for mining is too high for private capital: Even if two
or three small-size mines are merged, the investment threshold cannot typically be met.
Generally, only the large-size SOE mines can afford the total technology investment.
Furthermore, after a large investment, mines require advanced management. Most mine
owners cannot manage this effectively because of insufficient management knowledge.
Additionally, returns on coal mine investment are very slow and accompanied by high
risk. Fourth, there is no difference between the coal products produced in SOE mines
and those in TVE mines, and thus, small-size TVE mines are already competitive in the
market. Therefore, small-size mine owners tend to exploit the coal resource-extensively
but not resource-intensively and labor-intensively but not capital-intensively.
4.5 Empirical results
4.5.1 Empirical strategy
In the empirical section, we use two DID approaches to estimate the regulation effects on
regional development. For the first DID approach, we are concerned with the regulation
effects on the whole regional economy. We compare economic performance before and
after regulation to estimate the effects of policy changes in the coal mining industry
between regions with many or few small-size coal mines. The role of regulation may
vary in these regions: Regions with many small-size coal mines (determined by coal
endowment and local geology) are affected by regulation more than other regions are
because regulation is mainly targeted at small-size mines. For the second DID approach,
we focus on the regulation effects of the crowding-out of the coal mining industry on the
non-coal based economy. we compare the tertiary industry (non-coal based) performance
before and after regulation between regions with rich coal mine endowments and those
with other rich natural resource endowments. Both regions are highly dependent on
natural resources and have a similar regional industrial structure; however, only coal
mines were strongly regulated during the study period.
2One picture taken in 2007 shows a typical case of coal mining in China. A 17-
year-old miner carries over 50 kg of coal for 1 km. For each trip, he is paid 1
yuan (approximately 0.16 USD), which shows that despite heavy work, the wage is low.
(http://blog.sciencenet.cn/home.php?mod=space&uid=4699&do=blog&id=33987)
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Figure 4.4: The product share of small-size coal mines in total coal production
4.5.2 Coal mine regulation and the whole regional economy
We cannot observe the exact number of existing small-size coal mines, and the hetero-
geneity between mines is large. Alternatively, we use the output of small-size coal mines
to reflect the approximate number of small-size coal mines. Because the central govern-
ment decided to close small-size mines nationwide in 1997, we set this as the starting
point of the regulation policy.
We test the coal mine regulation effects using the DID approach. According to the official
classification, small-size coal mines mainly refer to TVE mines with an annual output
of less than 30,000 tons. Most coal mine accidents occurred in small-size mines, and,
thus, the central government decided to gradually close these mines or require them to
integrate into large-size mines. Because we use a provincial-level dataset and because the
geological heterogeneity among provinces is large, some regions are able to develop large-
size mines whereas others cannot because of natural reasons. That is, the output amount
of small-size mines can be viewed as exogenous before regulation (i.e., before 1997), but it
has been greatly affected by regulation (i.e., since 1997). The total production of small-
size coal mines has greatly decreased in the past decade. In 1996, the national output
was 59,000 tons. By 2008, the output of small-size coal mines decreased to 6,000 tons.
Figure 4.4 shows that before 1997, the total coal production product share of small-size
mines was stable among provinces. After 1996, when the regulatory policy on coal mines
was enacted, most provinces closed, upgraded, or merged their small-size mines, and the
product share for small-size mines was substantially reduced. Thus, stable output of
small-size mines before the regulation and reduced output after regulation provide an
exogenous source for checking coal mine regulation effects on economic growth. That
is, regions with high output of small-size mines before the regulation are expected to be
more heavily affected by the regulation.
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Governments in regions with high output of small-size mines prioritize regulation, and
thus, these regions are expected to benefit more from this policy change. That is, we
estimate the following equation. The annual GDP per capita growth (i.e., the deflated
annual GDP per capita index) in province i and year t is a function of the dummy
variable featuring the output of small-size coal mines (=1 if a province had high per
capita small-size coal mine output in 1991–1996 (before regulation)), the interaction
term between the small-size coal mines dummy and the post-regulation dummy variable
(=1 if year >1996), and controls such as coal dependence in the related province and
year. ηi and µt are the province and year dummies, respectively. If the regulation policy
improved economic performance, there should be a difference before and after regulation,
and α2 is expected to be positive.
GDPi,t = α0 + α1Small-sizei,t + α2Small-sizei,t × Postt + α3CoalDependencei,t
+α4Controlsi,t + ηi + µt + i,t
. (4.1)
We use annual data from 1986–2008 in 18 sample provinces, and we include all main coal
producers in China. We choose nine provinces with high per capita small-size coal mine
output before 1997 as the treated samples (Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Shaanxi, Guizhou,
Hunan, Xinjiang, Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Ningxia) and the other nine provinces with
low per capita small-size coal mine output as the control (Henan, Shandong, Anhui,
Yunnan, Hebei, Liaoning, Gansu, Fujian, and Guangxi). Under this setting, we guar-
antee that all of our samples are heavily dependent on the coal economy but only the
treated samples are heavily affected by coal mine regulation. Figure 4.4 shows that dur-
ing 1997–2008, most provinces almost shut down all of their small-size mines. However,
the product share of small-size mines in total coal production differs among provinces:
Some provinces immediately started to regulate small-size mines in 1997, whereas others
started later, for example, after 2000. This suggests that a long period (1986–2008) is
required to observe the regulation effects. Columns 1–3 in Table 4.1 show that under dif-
ferent fixed-effect settings, small-size mine dummies are not significantly associated with
economic performance; however, the interaction terms with the post-regulation dummy
are positively significant. Evidently, there is a difference before and after regulation. As
shown in column 1, on average, regulated provinces have 2.67% higher real GDP per
capita growth. Compared to the average annual real GDP per capita growth in our
samples (10.22% before regulation and 11.04% post regulation), regulation considerably
increased overall economic performance.
However, during the regulation period, macroeconomic policy for inland China under-
went significant changes. During the high growth period of the 1990s, China’s coastal
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regions gained significantly more than inland regions because of the “Reform and Open-
ing Up” policy. To relieve the widening regional disparities, three regional development
plans, the “Go West Campaign,” “Revitalizing Northeast China,” and “the Rise of
Central China” were gradually issued and enacted after 1999. These plans aimed to
stimulate development of inland regions and to moderate the large income gap between
coastal and inland China. These strategies proved to be efficient, and the overall GDP
growth of inland regions began overtaking that of coastal regions after 2004.
Because most of our sample provinces are located in inland regions, it is necessary to pay
attention to this exogenous variation. We conduct two types of estimations. First, in
columns 4–6, we insert three regional development policy dummies for specific provinces
(for West, Central, and Northeast; classification is presented in the Appendix) and
years: the “Go-West Campaign” from 2000 (post2000 = 1 if year >2000), “Revitalizing
Northeast China” from 2003 (post2003 = 1 if year >2003), and “the Rise of Central
China” from 2006 (post2006 = 1 if year >2006). Although Table 4.1 shows that the
concerned coefficients became smaller, the regulation effect on annual per capita GDP
growth shown in column 4 is 2.50% (slightly smaller than 2.67% in column 1); thus,
it is still significant. Then, in columns 7–8, we use the annual real wage growth index
(deflated by the provincial consumer price index) instead of the annual GDP per capita
growth index as the indicator and run estimations with two-way fixed effects. This
is because the regional development policies took effect mainly using investments, for
which GDP per capita growth is more sensitive than real wage growth is. We find that
the wage effect is smaller but still significant. Regulated provinces have 1.76% higher
annual real wage growth (column 7), a figure that increases to 1.82% after controlling
for the three regional development policies (column 8).
Finally, common trend between treatment and control groups, which is required for
an effective difference-in-difference approach, is guaranteed by placebo tests. We are
concerned on the common trend before the coal mine regulation in 1996, that is, in
the period of 1986-1996. We assume the economic performance between treatment and
control regions should not be systematically different, columns 1-2 of Table C.1 give
the related evidences. We set a counterfactual treatment cut point in 1990, that is,
we assume a placebo coal mine regulation was issued in 1990. Thus the time period
of 1986-1990 (1991-1996) is seen as the pre-treatment (post-treatment). By apply the
identical estimation strategy, our results are compatible to the baseline estimates. In
Column 1 of Table C.1, the coefficient of intersection term shows to be negative and
statistically significant, which is opposite with the sign in baseline estimates. This sug-
gests the treatment group actually has poor economic performance before the regulation
treatment. This is reasonable, as we argued in the first section, regions with rich coal
endowment tended to have poor economic performance, partially caused by the weakly
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ordered coal industry in the 1980s and early 1990s. Hence the coal mine regulation
was issued since 1996. Then, column 2 gives the estimates in real wage, the interested
coefficient comes to be insignificant now.
Table 4.1: DID approach with respect to whole regional economy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP GDP Wage Wage
Small-size × Post 2.669*** 2.312*** 2.780*** 2.499*** 2.077*** 2.640*** 1.760* 1.816*
(0.693) (0.806) (0.739) (0.621) (0.661) (0.675) (1.007) (1.000)
Small-size -2.935*** -2.868***
(0.954) (0.858)
Post -1.507** -1.302* 1.969*** -1.424** -1.619** 1.572** -11.42*** -11.46***
(0.582) (0.727) (0.727) (0.563) (0.628) (0.729) (1.555) (1.588)
CoalDependence 1.048 3.574*** 0.264 1.120 3.068*** 0.195 -0.133 -0.146
(1.049) (0.681) (0.558) (1.081) (0.763) (0.489) (0.711) (0.821)
West × Post2000 0.526 0.874*** 0.636 -0.441
(0.662) (0.406) (0.643) (0.978)
Northeast × Post2003 1.780** 3.828*** 1.195* 1.109*
(0.836) (0.611) (0.690) (0.626)
Central × Post2006 0.285 1.242 0.222 1.366*
(0.719) (0.726) (0.705) (0.677)
Constant 99.48*** 77.17*** 108.0*** 98.83*** 81.84*** 108.6*** 122.4*** 122.5***
(9.726) (6.307) (4.972) (9.937) (7.073) (4.414) (7.059) (8.023)
Year FE yes no yes yes no yes yes yes
Province FE yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
N 414 414 414 414 414 414 360 360
R2 0.577 0.175 0.574 0.583 0.209 0.579 0.615 0.615
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are
clustered at the province level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Years sampled: 1986–2008.
4.5.3 Coal mine regulation and non-coal based economy
Based on the theoretical framework, we show that the regulation on the coal mine sector
relieves the crowding-out effects of entrepreneurs in other sectors. Similar to the number
of small-size mines, the exact number of entrepreneurs in each sector is not available, and
we cannot distinguish between coal-based and non-coal-based economies. Alternatively,
we use the tertiary industry to represent non-coal based industries (in the theoretical
model, this is related to the “other sectors”) and determine the crowding-out effects.
Specifically, we apply this strategy using data of the performance of the tertiary industry
on the prefecture and city levels. Three considerations exist: First, ordinary cities
significantly differ from mine cities and cannot perform as a suitable control in DID
estimates. Therefore, other mine cities with rich oil, metal, or non-metallic minerals are
suitable candidates for controls because they have a similar industrial structure to coal
mine cities, that is, high dependency on natural resource (coal based or other natural
resource-based industries). Second, other mining industries were not regulated during
our study period, providing a chance to observe the policy change effects using the
DID approach. Identification of mine cities is based on China’s mining city database
(http://www.chinamining.com.cn/city/city.asp), and we selectively exclude mine cities
in which mined resources were almost completely exploited by 1999. Based on the
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database, we choose 24 prefecture-level coal mine cities as the treated samples and
the other 36 mine cities as the control samples. Third, at the prefecture level, the
economic performance of prefectures rich in natural resources are highly dependent on
resource-related industries. Thus, a direct observation of GDP growth is not suitable for
checking for coal mine regulation effects (e.g., the crowding-out effects), because GDP
in these prefectures include substantial mining and mine-related secondary industries.
We conduct estimations on the tertiary industry performance with respect to regulation
effects (i.e., the relief of crowding-out effects). Table 4.2 shows the DID results with
annual data for 1988–2007 and the following estimated equations.
Tertiaryi,t = α0 + α1CoalCityi × Postt + α2CoalCityi + µt + i,t. (4.2)
Tertiaryi,t is the value-added growth of the tertiary industry in city i and year t, Postt is
a dummy variable indicating pre- and post-1996, and CoalCityi is a dummy variable for
whether the related city is a coal mine city. In the interaction term between Postt and
CoalCityi, the coefficients presented in Table 4.2 are consistently positive and significant.
This provides evidence that the non-resource intensive industries benefited from coal
mine regulation in related regions. In columns 1–3, we conduct estimations with different
fixed effects, and in columns 4–6 and 7–9 we insert a coastal dummy (=1 if the sample
prefecture is located in coastal regions) and three regional development policy dummies,
respectively, to control for variation in macroeconomic policy changes (equal to the
dummy setting in Table 4.1). After controlling for the coastal dummy and for the three
regional development policy dummies, we find that the concerned coefficients, both their
absolute value and significance, are almost unchanged. Similarly, we present a placebo
test in column 3 of Table C.1 as estimates at the provincial level. By setting a placebo
treatment cut point in 1990, and restricting the sampled periods no later than 1996,
we do not find significant difference in the performance of tertiary industry between
treatment and control cities.
4.6 Robustness checks using mortality rate
The DID approaches may provide straightforward evidence of regulation effects. How-
ever, these approaches cannot offer evidence on the effects of the degree of regulation on
economic performance. We present another estimate in this section as further evidence.
One problem arises. There is no comprehensive indicators representing regulation, be-
cause regulation is a complex policy mainly (but not limited to) addressing the shuttering
of small-size mines. Alternatively, we use the mortality rate in coal mining as a proxy
of overall regulation quality.
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Table 4.2: DID approach with respect to the non-coal based economy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary Tertiary
CoalCity × Post 0.028* 0.028* 0.032** 0.029* 0.028* 0.032** 0.028* 0.028* 0.032*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
CoalCity -0.011 -0.010 -0.011
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Post -0.041* -0.034 -0.103*** -0.044* -0.036 -0.104*** -0.030 -0.025 -0.104***
(0.022) (0.029) (0.013) (0.023) (0.029) (0.014) (0.021) (0.030) (0.012)
Coastal × Post 0.008 0.007 0.005
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Coastal 0.007
(0.014)
West × Post2000 -0.025 -0.019 -0.001
(0.018) (0.023) (0.020)
Northeast × Post2003 -0.059 -0.050 -0.031
(0.046) (0.063) (0.068)
Central × Post2006 -0.002 -0.002 0.079***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.024)
constant 0.229*** 0.218*** 0.215*** 0.228*** 0.218*** 0.215*** 0.229*** 0.218*** 0.214***
(0.015) (0.020) (0.006) (0.016) (0.020) (0.006) (0.015) (0.020) (0.006)
Year FE yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no
City FE no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
N 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939 939
R2 0.278 0.278 0.102 0.278 0.278 0.103 0.278 0.278 0.110
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are
clustered at the prefecture level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Years sampled are 1988–1991&1995–2007. In 1992–1994, the statistical yearbook did not
include the related data. We exclude the samples with missing data
4.6.1 Coal mine regulation measurement: why mortality rate is a suit-
able proxy
Coal mine regulation is a comprehensive policy that includes cancellation or rejection
of coal mining licenses to small-size mines with insufficient investment and low annual
output, closing illegal mines and most existing small-size mines with low productivity,
improving mining technology, and enhancing the standard of compensation for min-
ing accidents. Because a computable official indicator is not available, we present the
argument that mortality rate is a potential suitable indicator for the quality of regula-
tion because it is highly correlated with the main regulation events. Mortality rate is
highly associated with investment improvements in the coal mine industry, an increase
in standards of compensation for mining accidents, and the closure of small-size mines.
Improved mining technology and investments not only enhance productivity but also
better guarantee safety in coal mining. High compensation standards for mining ac-
cidents force mine owners to invest more in safety facilities and technical training of
employees as well as to further relieve the frequency of mining accidents. Before 2000,
the owners of TVE mines paid limited reparations for mining accidents, generally less
than US$ 5,000 to each of the victim’s families. Compared to the revenue gained from
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mining, reparations were very affordable, that is, there was no incentive for mine own-
ers to improve production technology and safety or to provide vocational training for
mine employees. Furthermore, because of the low education levels, most employees in
TVE mines could not effectively protect their rights after accidents using the judiciary
system. Post-regulation (though still far from sufficient compared to developed coun-
tries), compensation and safety supervision have significantly increased: Compensation
for mining accidents to each victim’s families was approximately US$ 30,000 in 2004,
US$ 40,000–60,000 in 2009, and US$ 90,000–100,000 in 20113. Consistently, China’s coal
mining mortality rate declined rapidly, for a reduction of 80% from 2000–2009. Thus,
compensation standard has a negative relationship with mortality rate.
To regulate the coal industry, the Chinese government has withdrawn coal mining li-
censes for many small-size mines, particularly small-size mines with annual coal output
of less than 30,000 tons. Furthermore, the government stopped issuing licenses to new
small-size mining entrants in the mid-1990s. During the period 1995–2010, over 85%
of TVE mines were shut down (see Figure 4.2), most of which were small-size mines.
In 1995, small-size mines accounted for 43% of national coal output, but this figure
decreased by 2009 to less than 3%. The process of shutting down small-size mines is
a recent main characteristic of the Chinese coal industry. Consistently, in this period,
mortality rate was highly associated with the shuttering policy, decreasing from 4.89
to 0.89 person/million tons coal (see Figure 4.5). Mortality rates have varied greatly
across types of mines, and most accidents have happened in small-size mines. Whereas
the safety record for large-size SOE mines is as good as their counterparts in advanced
countries, small-size mines are potential death traps (Wang, 2006). In 1995, 10,572
people in China died in mining accidents, 70% of which occurred in TVE mines.
4.6.2 OLS relationship between mortality rate and GDP growth
We estimate the regulation effects using the mortality rate in coal mining as a proxy
of regulation quality. Following the general setup of the estimate on economic growth,
we use the control variables of social investment, labor resources, and technology. Coal
dependence varies among provinces, so we add controls for the region’s coal dependence.
Specifically, we model the real GDP per capita growth rate on the mortality rate (i.e.,
the logarithm of the mortality rate in coal mining), coal dependence (i.e., the logarithm
3Data is from XinHua Net for different accidents:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2005-01/30/content 2525350.htm;
http://www.yn.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2009-12/30/content 18633383.htm;
http://www.yn.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2011-04/08/content 22472427.htm.
Although there is no official standard or detailed record for compensation standards of mining accidents
and they differs between regions, the type of the mine, and social consequences, the compensation
standards increase based on coal mine regulation
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Figure 4.5: The mortality rate of coal mining in China
of coal production per capita), and other controls: investment (i.e., the share of total
fixed-asset investments in the GDP), human resources (i.e., the share of the population
with an educational level higher than senior high school in the provincial workforce),
technology (i.e., using the logarithm of foreign direct investment per capita as a proxy).
Furthermore, the logarithm of initial real GDP per capita to the control converges across
provinces.
We employ provincial panel data for the 15 years 1995–2009. Because not all provinces
have coal mines, we choose 20 provinces and provincial-level cities (18 provinces men-
tioned in Section 5.1 plus Sichuan and Chongqing) of mainland China4 based on the
coal mine locations and data availability. In total, these 20 locations account for 93.2%
(98.2%) of total coal production in 1995 (2009). To mitigate the noise caused by the
volatility of the year-after-year short-term economic growth and short-term mortality
rate, we set the panel data by using five time series (i.e., 1995–1997, 1998–2000, 2001–
2003, 2004–2006, and 2007–2009) and by employing the mean of the indicators into the
regression. Details of the dataset are presented in the Appendix. The panel regressions
include both provincial and time dummies to control for heterogeneity denoted by ηi
and µt, respectively. The baseline setup is as follows:
∆ ln(GDP)i,t = α0 +α1Mortalityi,t +α2CoalDependencei,t +α3Controlsi,t +ηi +µt + i,t.
(4.3)
The benchmark result is presented in column 1 of Table 4.3. The mortality rate proves to
be negatively associated with GDP growth. The degree of coal dependence varies widely
among provinces. To control for geographical heterogeneity and to determine whether
the benchmark result is driven by specific province features, we exclude Shanxi, Inner
Mongolia, Ningxia, Xinjiang, and Heilongjiang, which were the five provinces highest
4We exclude Sichuan and Chongqing in the DID approaches (Section 5.1), because Chongqing was
part of Sichuan before late 1990s; thus, separate data on these two regions before 1995 is not available.
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in coal dependence during 1995–1997. Mongolia and Shanxi have most large opencast
coal mines in China. An opencast coal mine is naturally safer than underground mines,
and mine accidents are easier to mitigate. Unsurprisingly, the estimated coefficient
(column 2 of Table 4.3) is reduced by 40% because these five excluded provinces are
China’s main coal producers, accounting for 40.0% (50.4%) of national coal output in
1995 (2009). However, the coefficient is still significant at the 1% level. Next, we must
consider that the coal industry mortality rate differs naturally among provinces because
of the geological features of the mines. Mining is considerably more dangerous in coal
mines deep under the surface of the earth than in opencast coal mines.
Table 4.3: Regressions with mortality rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
∆ ln(GDP) ∆ ln(GDP) ∆ ln(GDP) ∆ ln(GDP) ∆ ln(GDP) ∆ ln(GDP) ∆ ln(Wage)
baseline ex top 5 ex top 5 with interaction with regional policy initial value
in coal output in mortality rate term dummy
Mortality -0.016*** -0.009*** -0.019*** 0.010 -0.015*** -0.014** -0.016***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.005) (0.013) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
CoalDependence -0.000 -0.004 -0.003 0.012 0.001 0.003 -0.015
(0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
Mortality × -0.0025*
CoalDependence (0.0014)
InitialGDP -0.122*** -0.190*** -0.109*** -0.147*** -0.126*** -0.107*** -0.070
(0.035) (0.061) (0.035) (0.033) (0.037) (0.034) (0.080)
Educ 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Invest 0.072*** 0.030 0.084*** 0.069*** 0.075*** 0.082*** 0.064*
(0.026) (0.030) (0.032) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.037)
FDI 0.008 0.007 0.004 0.007 0.009 -0.000 0.008
(0.006) (0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007)
West × Post2000 -0.001
(0.006)
Northeast × Post2003 0.002
(0.005)
Central × Post2006 -0.013*
(0.007)
Constant 1.109*** 1.646*** 1.085*** 1.179*** 1.114*** 1.108*** 0.747
(0.267) (0.476) (0.282) (0.249) (0.279) (0.345) (0.607)
Year sample: 1995–2009 (three years per period); With two-way fixed effects
N 100 75 75 100 100 80 100
R2 0.809 0.849 0.835 0.817 0.819 0.836 0.792
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are
clustered at the province level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Column 6 refers to the period 1998–2009 (four periods) because of data restrictions.
To control for the heterogeneity in the mortality rate, we exclude Guizhou, Hunan,
Sichuan, Chongqing, and Xinjiang, the five provinces and provincial-level cities with the
highest mortality rate during 1995–1997. The results presented in column 3 are almost
unchanged, the coefficient of mortality rate is still significant at the 1% level, and the
magnitude becomes slightly larger. Furthermore, we insert an intersection of mortality
rates and coal dependence into the regression in column 4. Thus, the coefficient of the
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mortality rate becomes insignificant, and the coefficient of the intersection becomes sig-
nificant. Therefore, reasonably, the effects of coal mine mortality rates on GDP growth
heavily depend on a region’s coal dependence, which we can interpret as additional
evidence that the benchmark result is not endogenously caused by disturbances not
associated with the coal industry.
In column 5, we address the robustness with respect to the newly issued regional devel-
opment policies. Results in column 5 remain consistent. Then, in column 6, we use the
initial value of all control variables instead of the mean values to check these results, and
they are almost unchanged. Finally, in column 7, we use the real wage growth instead
of GDP per capita growth as a robustness check, and the results are consistent.
The potential endogeneity of the mortality rate to GDP growth must be controlled. First,
GDP growth rate is an important measuring index for China’s local government per-
formance; therefore, if the economic performance is poor, the government may overlook
safety inspections in social production, whereas good economic performance encourages
the local government to more closely monitor production safety. This criticism has al-
ways existed in developing economies, that is, governments tend to rapidly develop their
economy at the cost of high environmental pollution and frequent production accidents.
In this case, the inference previously mentioned might be biased.
We use another indicator of mortality rate to verify this concern. If a mortality rate
drop in the coal industry is attributed to the improving social economic performance,
then the safety of all industries improves but is not limited to coal industry. That is, in
other industries, similar empirical results between the mortality rate and real GDP per
capita growth may be obtained. We employ the total mortality rate in non-agricultural
industries (i.e., industry, mining, construction, commerce, and trade) as a substitute for
mortality rates in the coal industry, and we run the same regression. Column 1 of Table
4.4 shows that the result is significant, which potentially suggests that the benchmark
result is biased. However, the coal industry accounts for a high share of total mortality
accidents among the non-agricultural industries. In the mid-1990s, victims in coal mines
accounted for over 50% of total mortality accidents in social production, and coal mining
became the highest-risk occupation. The significant result in column 1 may be caused
by the large proportion of the coal industry for this indicator. In column 2, we insert
both mortality rate indicators into the regression; thus, the mortality rate in all non-
agricultural industries becomes insignificant, whereas the mortality rate for coal mining
is still significant. In column 3, we exclude the coal industry mortality from the total non-
agricultural industry mortality, and the modified mortality rate becomes insignificant.
That is, the significant result found in column 1 can be mainly attributed to the coal
industry. For other industries, the mortality rate has no significant effects on provincial
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GDP per capita growth. Finally, in column 4, we test with the real wage as a robustness
check. The result with respect to the mortality rate (excluding the coal mining industry)
is also insignificant.
Table 4.4: Regressions with additional mortality rates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln(GDP) ∆ ln(GDP) ∆ ln(GDP) ∆ ln(Wage)
MortalityCoal -0.016**
(0.007)
MortalityTotal -0.0198* -0.004
(0.0104) (0.012)
MortalityTotalExcoal -0.003 0.006
(0.014) (0.012)
InitialGDP -0.069 -0.137*** -0.080** 0.012
(0.044) (0.053) (0.041) (0.034)
Invest 0.052* 0.054* 0.049 0.043
(0.031) (0.028) (0.031) (0.029)
Educ 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
FDI 0.006 0.009 0.006 -0.009
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.011)
Constant 0.073* 1.301*** 0.777* 0.028
(0.042) (0.466) (0.403) (0.275)
Year sample: 2001–2009 (three years per period); With two-way fixed effects
N 60 60 60 60
R2 0.734 0.773 0.719 0.201
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are
clustered at the province level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Data refers to the period 2001–2009 (three periods) because of data restrictions.
4.7 Mechanism
Based on the previous sections, we can suppose that coal industry regulation has a
positive effect on the economic growth of regions with high coal dependence. Two
mechanisms can be used to interpret this result. First, productivity of the coal mine
industry is improved because of increased investment in fixed assets and economies
of scale originating from industrial concentration. Second, the crowding-out effect is
potentially relieved, because coal mining licenses in TVE mines are, to some extent,
prohibited. Even after obtaining the license, environmental recovery and technological
investment are strongly required, and production safety is inspected more seriously. In
this case, private capital in the coal industry may transfer to other industries that can
stimulate local labor resource accumulation and strengthen agglomeration economies.
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Primary mining is an industry with low labor resource accumulation, and the social total
factor productivity (TFP) growth is heavily dependent on labor resource accumulation.
In this study, we are concerned more with the second mechanism, which might improve
overall economic performance.
For the first mechanism, Table 4.5 shows that after controlling for the initial labor
productivity of the coal industry, the product share of small-size mines (annual output:
less than 30,000 tons) and middle-size mines (annual output: 30,000–300,000 tons), the
investment in the coal industry, and the skill of employees (here, we take the relative
wage as the proxy of skill: average wage of coal mining/average wage of all industries),
the mortality rate is still highly associated with coal mine labor productivity whether
the independent variable is based on the mean value (column 1) or the initial value
(column 2).
Table 4.5: Mechanism (intra-industry)
(1) (2)
LabProd LabProd
Mortality -0.248***
(0.073)
MortalityInitial -0.132*
(0.073)
SmallSizeMines 0.211 0.211
(less than 30,000 tons) (0.192) (0.182)
MiddleSizeMines 0.128 0.206
(30,000-300,000 tons) (0.210) (0.234)
LabProdInitial 0.295*** 0.310***
(0.082) (0.097)
InvestCoal 0.205*** 0.247***
(0.045) (0.040)
Skill 0.166 -0.006
(0.259) (0.200)
Constant 4.145*** 4.132***
(0.912) (1.041)
Year sample: 1995–2009 (three years per period);
With two-way fixed effects
N 100 80
R2 0.892 0.866
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are
clustered at the province level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Column 2 refers to the period 1998–2009 (four periods) because of data restrictions.
Thus, we try to distinguish the effects of regulation on the relief of crowding-out effects
between intra-industry productivity improvements. Regarding the estimation of the
crowding-out effects of coal resources, it is impossible to find a suitable measurement
directly. In the implementation, we first insert the labor productivity of the coal industry
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Table 4.6: Mechanism (whole economy)
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln(GDP) ∆ ln(GDP)Excoal ∆ ln(GDP)
Mortality -0.014*** -0.017*** -0.019***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
LabProd 0.014**
(0.007)
CoalDependence -0.008 -0.006 -0.004
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006)
InitialGDP -0.125*** -0.120*** -0.127**
(0.032) (0.047) (0.057)
Educ 0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Invest 0.068*** 0.078** 0.073**
(0.026) (0.033) (0.034)
FDI 0.007 0.004 0.008
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Constant 1.132*** 1.188*** 1.209***
(0.250) (0.343) (0.406)
Year sample: 1995-2009 (three years per period);
With two-way fixed effects
N 100 80 80
R2 0.817 0.789 0.834
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are
clustered at the province level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively. Columns 2 and 3 refer to the period 1995–2006 (four periods) because of data restrictions.
into the baseline setup. In column 1 of Table 4.6, the mortality rate coefficient remains
significant and the magnitude only slightly decreases after controlling for coal mining
labor productivity. Thus, intra-industry productivity improvement may not fully explain
the coal mine regulation effects on regional economic growth, because otherwise, the
coefficient of the mortality rate should become much smaller. The results of column
2 further confirm this. We calculate the modified real GDP per capita growth rate by
excluding the coal industry value-added in the total GDP. The estimated result supports
this assumption. Even without considering the coal industry, the mortality rate is still
highly associated with GDP per capita growth. Compared to the benchmark estimates
using the original GDP per capita growth rate in column 3, the magnitude is reduced
from -0.019 to -0.017, and the t-test doesn’t present significant differences between these
two GDP growth rate indicators. Therefore, the regulation effects are not limited only
to the coal industry, and the spillover effect originating from the relief of crowding-out
effects may play a role here.
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4.8 Conclusion
Although rich resource endowment is not necessarily negatively associated with regional
economic growth, the resource curse is observed in many countries worldwide, and in-
stitutions are seen as a main factor determining the role of resource abundance. Using
the ongoing regulation of the coal industry in China, empirical evidence indicates that
after regulation, labor productivity in the coal industry improved and the crowding-out
effect of coal mining on other economic activities was relieved. Both consequences posi-
tively improved regional economic performance. Our findings present evidence that the
relationship between resource abundance and regional economic performance is subject
to resource management and institutions. In addition, we find that coal mine regulation
has gradually reduced frequent mine accidents and deaths in China. Finally, we admit
a shortcoming of this study that both our theoretical model and empirical strategies
neglect the cross-regional mobility of entrepreneur and capital, which is common in real
world.
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Figure A.1: National trunk highway system
Source: Ministry of Transport of P. R. China.
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Figure A.2: National highway system planned 7918 highway network
Source: Xinhua Net.
Figure A.3: Kernel density of propensity score (1)
Figure A.4: Kernel density of propensity score (2)
Appendix A. Appendix of Chapter 2 88
Table A.1: Mean of covariates used in the matching procedure
Variate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
area size 1766 1988 2393 2057 3286 2287
(1022) (1569) (1076) (1511) (4898) (1235)
minimum distance to 170 185 221 312 336 306
large cities (71) (102) (68) (154) (164) (111)
minimum distance to 271 278 390 646 813 713
large ports (133) (151) (115) (281) (380) (308)
employment share of 0.17 0.14 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.06
secondary sector (0.13) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
employment share of 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.11
tertiary sector (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
firm density 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
population density 447 321 298 344 205 258
(278) (270) (253) (239) (211) (192)
population share 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.09 0.09
(education>high school) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
initial per capita GDP 8.68 8.56 8.44 8.20 7.82 7.90
(0.51) (0.41) (0.39) (0.40) (0.49) (0.53)
Region Coastal Coastal Coastal Inland Inland Inland
Highway access Yes No Potential Yes No Potential
No. obs. 155 101 20 243 379 85
Note: Owing to data restrictions, population, employment, and education data come from the 5th
national population census in 2000. In PSM, it is required that we measure the covariates before partici-
pation or fix them over time, and as such, we assume that these indicators are relatively fixed from 1998
to 2000. Owing to China’s “Hukou” system, population mobility in peripheral regions is fairly limited.
S.D. in parentheses. The description of the covariates is as follows:
area size: land area (km2);
minimum distance to large cities: minimum spherical distance to three provincial cities (Shanghai, Bei-
jing, and Tianjin) and 16 sub-provincial cities (Harbin, Changchun, Shenyang, Dalian, Qingdao, Nanjing,
Wuhan, Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Chengdu, Chongqing, Ji’nan, Ningbo, Xiamen, and Xi’an)
in 1998;
minimum distance to large ports: minimum spherical distance to Dalian, Tianjin, Shanghai, and
Guangzhou, the largest port cities of the Northeast, North, East, and South regions of mainland China,
respectively (i.e., of Dongbei, Huabei, Huadong, and Hua’nan, respectively);
employment share of secondary sector : employment share of the secondary sector in total employment;
employment share of tertiary sector : employment share of the tertiary sector in total employment;
firm density : number of industrial firms above the designated size per km2;
population density : resident population per km2;
population share (education>high school): share of population with a high school or higher education;
initial per capita GDP : log of per capita GDP (Yuan) in 1998.
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Table A.2: Mean of outcome indicators
Variate (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
GDP per capita 1998 6666 5690 4963 3930 2811 3069
(3463) (2579) (1689) (1648) (1480) (1493)
GDP per capita 2007 16729 14445 11881 10280 7496 8161
(9904) (9663) (3545) (5785) (5468) (5750)
Firm density 1998 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.02
(0.08) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Firm density 2007 0.21 0.11 0.08 0.05 0.02 0.02
(0.35) (0.27) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)
Investment 1998 9.33 6.50 6.96 5.09 2.66 4.29
(9.50) (10.83) (5.79) (6.17) (7.44) (10.37)
Investment 2007 32.32 17.40 14.97 15.22 6.66 12.22
(39.97) (24.56) (12.28) (17.92) (10.55) (27.11)
Output 1998 5.28 3.09 4.02 2.50 1.11 1.59
(5.84) (4.01) (4.30) (3.03) (2.39) (2.25)
Output 2007 35.91 19.20 19.53 15.37 6.32 8.62
(36.80) (29.89) (17.17) (16.41) (9.48) (10.73)
Region Coastal Coastal Coastal Inland Inland Inland
Highway access Yes No Potential Yes No Potential
No. obs. 155 101 20 243 379 85
Note: S.D. in parentheses. Description of the indicators is as follows:
GDP per capita: per capita GDP (Yuan) in 1998 & 2007;
Firm density: number of industrial firms above the designated size per km2 in 1998 & 2007;
Investment: net value of fixed assets of industrial firms above the designated size (100 million Yuan) in
1998 & 2007;
Output: value-added of industrial firms above the designated size (100 million Yuan) in 1998 & 2007.
Table A.3: Post-matching differences in covariates (bias %)
Covariate 2.1-2.4 2.5-2.8 3.1-3.4 3.5-3.8 7.1-7.4 7.5-7.8, 9.1-9.2 9.3-9.4
8.1-8.6
area size -12.9 5.9* 29.2 -4.5 4.0 2.8 -14.0 -2.9
min. distance to large cities -7.5 4.0 50.3 -8.7 5.1 -19.5 -3.7 -19.5
min. distance to large ports -11.5 9.6 74.7* 0.2 2.1 16.6 -9.7 16.6
empl. share of secondary sector 9.7 5.5 -27.9 -5.2 -5.1 2.0 5.4 2.2
empl. share of tertiary sector 1.2 5.0 10.6 -11.0 5.0 -2.4 -2.8 -2.5
firm density 11.3 15.2 -47.0 12.7 10.8 -9.1 8.2 -9.1
pop. density 7.9 0.9 -32.1 7.2 -8.8 4.0 11.2 4.0
pop. share (educ.>high school) -6.0 -1.5 42.9 -10.9 0.7 -16.2 -11.6 -16.3
initial p.c. GDP 10.4 8.8 -38.0 -5.2 8.2 2.9 8.7 2.9
Note: The numbers in the first line imply the related tables and columns in Tables 2.2–2.3, 2.7–2.9. For
example, 3.1–3.4 means data related to columns 1–4 of Table 2.3.
* Significant at the 10% level.
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Table B.1: Descriptive summary of Central Asia economy
Indicator Country 1996 1998 2000 2001 2003 2005
Population Kazakhstan 15.6 15.1 14.9 14.9 14.9 15.1
(in million) Tajikistan 5.9 6.0 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.8
Uzbekistan 23.2 24.1 24.7 25.0 25.6 26.2
Kyrgyzstan 4.6 4.8 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.2
Turkmenistan 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.7
GDP per capita Kazakhstan 1990 2052 2344 2664 3187 3771
(constant 2005 US$) Tajikistan 206 215 234 254 301 340
Uzbekistan 399 422 446 459 486 547
Kyrgyzstan 360 392 417 435 457 476
Turkmenistan 1270 1170 1404 1449 1469 1707
Exports Kazakhstan 17.4 15.5 22.1 21.7 27.2 30.6
(constant 2005 US$, in billion) Tajikistan 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.6
Uzbekistan 3.9 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.8 5.4
Kyrgyzstan 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.9 1.0
Turkmenistan 1.8 0.9 2.8 2.9 3.7 5.3
Imports Kazakhstan 20.2 20.1 21.1 20.7 19.8 25.5
(constant 2005 US$, in billion) Tajikistan 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.2
Uzbekistan 4.8 3.4 3.0 3.2 3.1 4.1
Kyrgyzstan 1.3 1.1 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.4
Turkmenistan 1.8 1.8 2.4 2.7 3.4 3.9
Manufactures imports Kazakhstan 64 71 74 75 78 78
(% of merchandise imports) Tajikistan - - - - - -
Uzbekistan - - - - - -
Kyrgyzstan 48 57 59 56 57 52
Turkmenistan - 79 80 - - -
Note: Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank.
-: related data is not available.
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Table B.2: Rail transport infrastructure improvements in Central Asia
Country Indicator 1996 1998 2000 2001 2003 2005
Kazakhstan Railways, goods transported (billion ton-km) - - 125.0 - 147.7 171.9
Rail lines (total route-thousand km) - - 13.5 - 13.8 14.2
Tajikistan Railways, goods transported (billion ton-km) 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.1 -
Rail lines (total route-thousand km) - - - - - 0.6
Uzbekistan Railways, goods transported (billion ton-km) 19.7 15.7 15.4 - - 18.0
Rail lines (total route-thousand km) - 3.6 3.6 - - 4.0
Note: Data source: World Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank.
Data on roads is not presented because most of them is not available for the related years in WDI.
Data on Kyrgrzstan and Turkmenistan is not available.
-: related data is not available.
Table B.3: Descriptive summary of dataset
Panel A: Summary of variables (2000-2001)
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Rail Export value (USD) 2851 169021 810416 152 2.10E+07
Number of shipments 2851 1.80 2.00 1 23
Number of exporters 2060 1.38 1.06 1 17
Unit price (USD) 6879 16341 258353 0.002 1.07E+07
Non-rail Export value (USD) 4421 181593 1204678 220 4.00E+07
Number of shipments 4421 2.37 2.90 1 31
Number of exporters 2253 1.96 2.19 1 25
Unit price (USD) 12798 1471 32173 0.003 2.90E+06
Panel B: Statistical summary of main indicators
2000 2001 2000 2001
Rail Non-rail
Export value (total, USD 1,000,000) 216.4 266.14 553.62 251.9
Number of shipments (total) 2849 2293 6103 4387
Number of export firms (total) 248 331 241 319
Value per shipment (medium, USD 1,000) 17.82 23.33 14.4 15.84
Value per shipment (mean, USD 1,000) 75.96 116.07 90.22 57.48
Annual value per firm-product-country (medium, USD 1,000) 17.5 19.8 10.7 12
Annual value per firm-product-country (mean, USD 1,000) 137.8 207.2 224.1 128.4
Unit price (medium, USD) 1.3 1.6 1.2 1.1
Unit price (mean, USD) 62.2 71.6 16.9 29.5
Note: Panel A: Export value and number of shipments are based on aggregated firm-product (HS-
8)-country-freight mode-year level data, number of exporters is based on aggregated product (HS-8)-
country-freight mode-year level data, and the unit price is based on transaction level data.
Panel B: Unit price (mean, USD) is obtained after winsorizing 95% (one way cut-off) of the total
observations to avoid disturbance from outliers (extremely large unit prices).
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Table B.4: Sped-up mileage to Urumqi (Xinjiang)
Starting point Speed-up point Sped-up mileage Total mileage
(Province) (Station) (km) (km)
Xinjiang Urumqi 0 0
Gansu Lanzhou 1892 1892
Ningxia Lanzhou 1892 2008
Qinghai Lanzhou 1892 2120
Beijing Lanzhou 1892 3216
Tianjin Lanzhou 1892 3240
Inner Mongolia Lanzhou 1892 3000
Liaoning Lanzhou 1892 4007
Tibet Lanzhou 1892 4080
Hebei Lanzhou 1892 2822
Chongqing Baoji 2395 3345
Guizhou Baoji 2395 3840
Sichuan Baoji 2395 3026
Hainan Baoji 2395 5214
Yunnan Baoji 2395 5564
Shaanxi Xi’an 2568 2568
Shanxi Xi’an 2568 2597
Henan Zhengzhou 3079 3079
Shandong Zhengzhou 3079 3134
Fujian Zhengzhou 3079 4555
Guangdong Zhengzhou 3079 4684
Anhui Zhengzhou 3079 3723
Guangxi Zhengzhou 3079 5493
Hunan Zhengzhou 3079 3977
Hubei Zhengzhou 3079 4342
Shanghai Xuzhou 3428 4077
Jiangsu Xuzhou 3428 3776
Zhejiang Xuzhou 3428 4168
Heilongjiang Xuzhou 3428 4490
Jilin Xuzhou 3428 4244
Jiangxi Nanchang 4129 4129
Table B.5: Effect of unit price changes
∆Unitprice
(1) (2)
Xinjiang 0.0195 0.0954
(0.0552) (0.0767)
Samples rail rail
Sample type f-p-c p-c
Observations 257 148
R-squared 0.0005 0.0105
Note: ∆Unitprice=Unitprice2001/Unitprice2000.
Regression equation is: ∆Unitpricef,p,c=α0+α1Xinjiangf+f,p,c. Xinjiang is a dummy variable (=1
for exports originating from Xinjiang, and, =0 for others).
I compare the unit price change between rail freight products originating from Xinjiang and other regions.
If there is a decrease in transportation costs, there should be a decrease in the F.O.B. unit price, since
it contains domestic transportation costs.
I drop the samples if the unit price difference is abnormally large. I keep only the samples where
∆Unitprice is larger than 1/3, and less than 3. I use the mean unit price in related sample types for
a specific year. For column 1, I keep only paired data at the f-p-c level. For column 2, I identify two
regions (Xinjiang and other regions) at the p-c level. I keep only paired data at the specified p-c level, if
both Xinjiang and the other region have paired data at this p-c level (four records (twoyears*tworegions)
should be matched at each p-c.).
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Appendix of Chapter 4
Table C.1: Placebo tests
(1) (2) (3)
GDP Wage Tertiary
Small-size × post1990 -2.006* -0.653 CoalCity × post1990 -0.020
(1.094) (1.117) (0.032)
post1990 3.985*** 3.967*** post1990 -0.032
(1.248) (1.676) (0.034)
CoalDependence -0.132 -7.306
(2.649) (4.986)
Constant 110.2*** 86.54* Constant 2.207***
(24.01) (46.11) (0.018)
Year FE yes yes Year FE yes
Province FE yes yes City FE yes
N 198 144 N 258
R2 0.546 0.748 R2 0.236
Note: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported in parentheses, and standard errors are
clustered at the province level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
C.1 Data source
Data used in this chapter were obtained from many sources.
GDP: deflated annual GDP per capita index, from the “China Statistical Yearbook.”
Wage: annual real wage growth index deflated by consumer price index, from the “China
Labor Statistical Yearbook” and the “China Statistical Yearbook.”
CoalDependence: logarithm of (coal output/total population; ton/10,000 people), from
the “China Coal Industry Yearbook.”
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West: dummy for Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, Xinjiang, Sichuan, Chongqing, Yunnan,
Guizhou, Guangxi, and Inner Mongolia.
Northeast: dummy for Heilongjiang, Jilin, and Liaoning.
Central: dummy for Henan, Hunan, Anhui, and Shanxi.
Tertiary: prefecture-level value-added growth of tertiary industries, from the “China
City Statistical Yearbook.”
∆ ln(GDP): Real GDP per capita annual growth rate is calculated as:
∆ ln(GDP)=
ln GDPp.c.i+3−ln GDPp.c.i
3
i refers to year. GDPp.c.: real GDP per capita, from the “China Statistical Yearbook.”
∆ ln(Wage): Real wage annual growth rate in Section 6 is calculated as
∆ ln(Wage)=
ln RealWagei+3−ln RealWagei
3
RealWage: real wage (deflated by the consumer price index), from the “China Labor
Statistical Yearbook” and the “China Statistical Yearbook.”
Mortality: logarithm of mortality rate in the coal industry (person/100 million tons),
from the “China Coal Industry Yearbook” and the “Statistical Communique´ of the
National Economic and Social Development” at the provincial level.
InitialGDP: logarithm of the initial real GDP per capita, from the “China Statistical
Yearbook.”
Invest: the total social investment in fixed assets/GDP, from the “China Statistical
Yearbook.”
Educ: share of workers with an education level higher than senior high school of total
employment (%), from the “China Labor Statistical Yearbook.”
FDI: logarithm of (FDI/total population; US$/person), from the “China Statistical
Yearbook.”
MortalityTotal: logarithm of the mortality rate in non-agricultural industries (person-
s/million workers), from the “China’s Work Safety Yearbook” and the “Statistical Com-
munique´ of the National Economic and Social Development” at the provincial level.
MortalityTotalExcoal: logarithm of the mortality rate in non-agricultural industries
after excluding the coal industry (persons/million workers), from the “China’s Work
Safety Yearbook” and the “Statistical Communique´ of the National Economic and Social
Development” at the provincial level.
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SmallSizeMines (less than 30,000 tons): product share of small-size mines (i.e., annual
output less than 30,000 tons) to total coal output, from the “China Coal Industry
Yearbook.”
MiddleSizeMines (30,000–300,000 tons): product share of mines (annual output less than
300,000 tons and larger than 30,000 tons) to total coal output, from the “China Coal
Industry Yearbook.”
LabProd: logarithm of (coal output/coal industry employment; ton/person), from the
“China Coal Industry Yearbook” and the “China Labor Statistical Yearbook.”
InvestCoal: logarithm of [investment of coal industry in fixed assets (including only SOE
mines)/employment in the coal industry; 10,000 yuan/person], from the “China Energy
Statistical Yearbook.”
Skill: average wage of coal industry/average wage of all industries, from the “China
Labor Statistical Yearbook”.
∆ ln(GDP)Excoal: modified ∆ ln(GDP) after excluding the value-added of the coal in-
dustry to total GDP, from the “China Statistical Yearbook,” the “China Industry Econ-
omy Statistical Yearbook,” and the “Statistical Yearbook (Provincial-level).”
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